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ABSTRACT 
On April 6, 1994, the airplane returning the President of Rwanda home was shot 
down. After appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the countries ongoing civil 
war, the nation was now plunged into an ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous 
results. What led the extremist elements of the President's ruling elite class to view this 
alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige they would incur with 
implementation of the peace accords? To answer this question, this thesis examines how 
Rwanda's two ethnic groups were manipulated to ethnically stratify the country. After 
independence and a reversal of ethnic control, the new regionally based elites 
consistently returned to an ethnically divisive strategy to unite the population and 
maintain their narrow base of power over other regional elites. The onset of civil war in 
1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled with international pressure for democratic reforms 
ultimately led to the Arusha Accords. The Accords in due course failed both because of 
extremist fears of the loss of their power and prestige, and the failure of the international 
community to back the vital provisions of the accords. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying the President of Rwanda was shot own. 
The President was retiming from a conference on implementing the provisions of a 
negotiated agreement, the Arusha Accords, to end that countries ongoing civil war. After 
appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the war, the country was plunged into an 
ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous results 
What led the extremist elements within the presidents ruling elite class to view 
this alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige that they would 
incur with full implementation of the accords? To examine this question, this thesis 
examines the historical context of Rwanda whereby the two ethnic groups, the Hutu and 
the Tutsi, which had lived amicably for centuries had their ethnicity manipulated. This 
manipulation first occurred through the extension of the centralized authority of the Tutsi 
king (mwami) over the predominantly Hutu country. This extension of Tutsi control 
began the process by which the two parties began to actively identify themselves with 
ethnic labels. 
This authority became all pervasive with the arrival of the colonial authorities to 
the country. These Europeans chose to administer the country indirectly through the Tutsi 
mwami and intensified the ethnic stratification between the Hutu and the Tutsi by altering 
political structures to their advantage. The Europeans invented racist theories to support 
their conclusion that the Tutsi were a superior ethnic group to the Hutu and thus more 
capable of ruling the country. 
After the achievement of independence in 1961, a reversal of power occurred with 
a Hutu republic established. A wave of ethnic violence against the Tutsi was unleashed 
ix 
which caused a mass exodus of the Tutsi to neighboring countries. The countries new 
regionally based Hutu elites consistently returned to ethnic strategy in an attempt to unite 
the population and maintain their narrow base of power from the encroachment of other 
regional Hutu elites. The onset of civil war in 1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled 
with international pressure for democratic reforms within the government led to the 
Arusha Accords that failed both because of the fear of the loss of power and prestige, and 
the failure of the international community to adequately back the vital provisions of the 
accords. 
Following the achievement of the Arusha Accords, the United Nations Security 
Council opted to not provide an adequate mandate for the peacekeeping mission. The 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was to deploy to the country 
to ensure the peace and security during the implementation phase of the accords. The end 
of the Cold War had altered the West's perception of their individual national security 
interests within Africa and placed the continent on a much lower priority. The result of 
this disinterest was an inadequate mandate for the UNAMIR mission that was incapable 
of both guaranteeing the security and stopping the violence that followed the crash of the 
presidential airplane. 
In the wake of the Cold War, there have been calls for reform of the United 
Nations Security Council to be more responsive to the needs of the underdeveloped 
nations. The movements towards reform of the Security Council have made no real 
progress. The other option for a reasonable solution to African security problems has 
come from western initiatives to build African capacities for peacekeeping operations. 
The P3 initiative between the United States, France and the United Kingdom, offers a 
comprehensive training program for various African nations to build this capacity. 
XI 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
During the months of April-June 1994, the tiny central African nation of Rwanda 
experienced one of the most tragic occurrences of modern genocide. According to Alison 
Des Forges of Human Rights Watch: 
In the thirteen weeks after April 6, 1994, at least half a million people 
perished in the Rwandan genocide, perhaps as many as three quarters of 
the Tutsi population. At the same time, thousands of Hutu were slain 
because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces directing it.1 
The dominant ethnic group of the nation, the Hutu, committed the genocide. 
These Hutu, mostly connected with President Juvenal Habyarimana and his northwestern 
region clan network, and they targeted members of the minority ethnic group, the Tutsi. 
The civil war had begun in Rwanda in 1990 with the invasion of the country by 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels who were predominantly Tutsi. The attack 
originated from their haven in Uganda and the conflict continued into 1993. Growing 
domestic and even international pressures forced the Habyarimana ruling elite to 
grudgingly allow the growth of a multiparty system and eventually a coalition 
government that in turn led to peace discussions. 
The opposition factions of the Rwandan government conducted these peace 
discussions with the RPF officials in Arusha, Tanzania. These discussions led to a signed 
peace agreement in August 1993 between the warring parties that arranged for a power 
sharing government and a return of exiled Tutsi to Rwanda. It was during this period of 
1
 Alison Des Forges, Leave None To Tell The Story, ,(New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1999), pp. 1. 
1 
renewed hope and potential for reconciliation that the extremist groups within the 
Habyarimana government unleashed the genocide campaign against their enemies. 
A.       INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF FAILURE 
On March 25, 1998, President Bill Clinton of the United States made a symbolic 
visit to Rwanda. He stated his purpose for making this short stop at the airport of the 
Rwandan capital: 
I have come today to pay the respects of my nation to all who suffered and 
all who perished in the Rwandan genocide. It is my hope that through this 
trip, in every corner of the world today and tomorrow, their story will be 
told; that four years ago in this beautiful, green, lovely land, a clear and 
conscious decision was made by those then in power that the peoples of 
this country would not live side by side in peace. During the 90 days that 
began on April 6 in 1994, Rwanda experienced the most intensive 
slaughter in this blood-filled century we are about to leave. Families 
murdered in their home, people hunted down as they fled by soldiers and 
militia, through farmland and woods as if they were animals.2 
President Clinton as the leader of the lone superpower acknowledged that: 
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear 
its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly 
enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee 
camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call 
these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. 
But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future 
without fear, and full of hope.3 
2
 President William J. Clinton, "Kigali Airport Remarks" Kigali, Rwanda 25 
March 1998, Available online at: 
http://www.usinfo.state/regional/af/prestrip/w98Q325a.htm [2 April 2001]. 
3 Ibid. 
The President's visit to Rwanda was termed "very symbolic" by Press Spokesman 
Mike McCurry. McCurry characterized that the visit as a "dramatic way to underscore the 
importance the United States attaches to efforts to resolve the conflicts there that have led 
to genocide, have led to the brutality that have cost so many innocent civilians their 
lives."4 
President Clinton was not alone among international figures and bodies in 
publicly proclaiming the failure of the international community and regional 
organizations to recognize the development of the conditions for and the conduct of the 
genocide campaign in Rwanda. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) commissioned 
an International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) in 1998 with a mandate to 
investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events in the Great Lakes 
Region as part of the efforts aimed at averting and preventing further wide-scale conflicts 
in the region.5 The panel released its report in May 2000 with a stinging rebuke of the 
actions of the governments of the United States, France, Britain, and Belgium as well as 
for the United Nations and the OAU. 
The United Nations conducted its own independent introspective panel, that 
faulted the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
4
 Charles W. Corey, "Clinton Africa Trip to include stop in Rwanda," USIA, 11 
March 1998, Available Online at: 
http://www.usinfo.state/regional/af/prestrip/w980311 a.htm [11 April 2001]. 
5
 OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," submitted by the International 
Panel of Eminent Personalities, 29 May 2000, E.S.I, Available online: http://www.oau- 
oua.org/Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm [ 17 September 2000]. 
Chapter VI peacekeeping force, for a series of political missteps, muddled mission 
mandate, and a flagrant lack of political will to stop the genocide. The UN and its offices 
missed clear signals that the peace accords were not holding, including the explicit 
exchange of cables between General Dallaire and the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), in which he advised of intelligence information of a pending 
genocide campaign. He asked permission to act vigorously but was denied this 
permission because it was considered to be inconsistent with his mandate. 
In retrospect, the international community failed the people of Rwanda during the 
April-June 1994 period. A panel of international senior military officers met at 
Georgetown University in 1997 "to review the outbreak of violence in Rwanda and to 
reconsider what could have been done to stop it."6 Among the panel's conclusions, 
according to Colonel Scott Feil, was to send an international peace enforcement force 
numbering around 5,000 personnel "armed with all the weapons, equipment and 
capabilities necessary to employ and sustain a brigade in combat." If deployed within the 
window of opportunity that existed from April 7-24, 1994, it could have made a 
significant difference in the outcome of the genocide.7 
The Commander of the UNAMIR force, General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, 
submitted for approval to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) a 
draft Rules of Engagement (ROE) in November 1993. This draft document, as noted in 
6
 Col. Scott R. Feil, "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: 
Early Intervention Reconsidered," ISD Report Vol. IE, No. 2, April 1997, Available 
[Online] http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/rwanda.htm [April 11, 2001.] 
7 Ibid. pp. 6. 
the UN Investigation of the events, contained a rule in paragraph 17 that would 
specifically allow the UNAMIR mission: 
to act, and even to use force, in response to crimes against humanity and 
other abuses ("There may also be ethnically or politically motivated 
criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and 
legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. 
Examples are executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees.")8 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations never responded to the draft ROE. 
Although the draft ROE was eventually provided to the UNAMIR contingent, the force 
sat paralyzed while political and ethnically motivated violence increased from August 
1993 until July 1994. 
B.        FAILURE OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS 
The tragedy of Rwanda needs to be examined within the context of the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords. The Accords were the culmination of over a year 
of negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda, represented by the 
opposition elements of the coalition government. Negotiations took place in Arusha, 
Tanzania facilitated by the OAU and the Tanzanian President. 
Why did the accords collapse? The collapse occurred in part due to the extreme 
reluctance of the ruling party elites and extremists to share any power. While the 
coalition government arrangement of 1992 had weakened the grip on the government of 
President Habyarimana, his faction maintained the lion's share of the power. 
Implementation of the accords would have ended their stranglehold on the Rwandan 
8
 United Nations Secretariat, Report Of The Independent Inquiry Into The Actions 
of the United Nations During The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda, December 15,1999. 
populace and organs of power, granting power to the hated Tutsi and the Hutu from other 
regions within the country. Full implementation of the accords would have unmistakably 
ended the control of the Hutu from the northwestern part of the country on the 
government. 
The accords also were a true victory for the RPF. They were not only returning as 
a legitimate political force within the country, but in a sense their share of power could be 
construed as disproportionate to their percentage of the population. The opposition Hutu 
Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR), also stood to gain from the full 
implementation of the accords. The party had succeeded in potentially ending the grip of 
control by the northwestern Hutu of Habyarimana and in turning the powers of the 
presidency over to a Prime Minister in the new government. 
Did the negotiators at Arusha know that the accords contained provisions that 
would be untenable. The OAU tends to conduct conflict resolution but to leave the actual 
implementation of a peace accord to the United Nations. This reflects a core tenet of the 
OAU, to not intervene in the internal affairs of its members. 
The implementation of the Arusha Accords were predicated on the execution of a 
robust international peace keeping mandate that, in the post cold war era of western 
withdrawal from Africa, was a questionable assumption. The OAU itself did not have the 
capacity to act as the guarantor of the accords. This inability is itself a reflection of the 
lack of moral and physical authority that this organization can project given its elevation 
of the sovereign rights of the member nations above the basic human rights of the 
inhabitants. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
An survey of the available primary and secondary sources of information with 
regard to the genocide in Rwanda, conflict resolution, and the international aspects of 
humanitarian intervention was undertaken for this thesis. Where it was possible, actual 
participants in the events and leading academics were consulted both for their expertise in 
the various areas and for their recollections of the events. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The second chapter of this thesis examines the historical context of Rwanda to 
include the so-called "ethnic myth," the effects of ethnic stratification imposed on the 
country by the colonial powers and the later perversion of this process by post-colonial 
regional elites. Chapter III will examine those aspects internal to Rwandan politics that 
presented insurmountable obstacles to the full and successful implementation of the 
Arusha Accords, and that was hindered by the international communities lack of interest 
in a humanitarian intervention into the country on the heels of Somalia. Chapter IV will 
examine the roles of various international actors in precluding the establishment of an 
effective mandate for the UNAMIR mission. Key issues within this area were: 
• The role of the OAU within the region; 
• the role of the current make-up and powers of the United Nations Security 
Council; 
• the United States experience in Somalia and the subsequent publishing of 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) "Reforming Multilateral 
Peacekeeping Operations." 
Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations for the future in the hope of 
avoiding a reoccurrence of the conditions that would foster the ethnically charged 
environment that promoted genocide. It also offers ways that Sub-Saharan Africa, as a 
region, could act on its own behalf to prevent genocide. 
7 
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II.      THE ETHNIC MYTH 
A.        STARTING UP 
On the evening of April 6, 1994, a spotless Falcon Mystere 50 business jet flown 
by a French Air Force crew, carrying Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana, and 
neighboring Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira, made its final approach to the 
airport in the Rwandan capital city of Kigali. President Habyarimana was returning from 
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania where he had been taken to task by various leaders of the Great 
Lakes region for his failure to implement the provisions of the Arusha Accords. 
The accords had been a hopeful sign, signaling the end of the nearly three year 
long civil war. They had been concluded largely between members of the newly formed 
opposition parties, negotiating on behalf of the coalition government that was, in itself, an 
uneasy alliance of President Habyarimana's Mouvement Revolutionaire National Pour le 
Developpement et la Democratic MRND (D) party, the opposition parties, and the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was an exiled Tutsi ethnic group seeking the 
repatriation of thousands of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. 
At approximately 8:30 PM a surface-to-air missile, launched from an area near 
the capital that was ostensibly under the control of the elite Presidential Guard unit loyal 
to President Habyarimana, destroyed the plane killing all on board. 9 In the hours 
9
 The truth about the Presidential aircraft's downing may never be known. Some 
theories have been raised blaming various parties such as the Belgian government, the 
French government, and the RPF. The French government concluded a detailed 
investigation of their role in the genocide in 2000, devoting more than 50 pages to the 
shoot down without resolving the issue. The French military and Security Services 
refused to answer questions before the National Assembly Investigating Panel. 
immediately following the death of President Habyarimana, a calculated, systematic 
campaign was unleashed to eliminate both the Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were viewed 
as enemies of the right wing.10 
What led the Hutu extremists to abandon the Arusha process so completely? The 
evidence suggests that some one or some group planned the campaign for several years 
following the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in 1990. If the suggestion of right wing 
complicity is true, why, when confronted with increasing international pressures to open 
the Habyarimana government to democratic reforms, did the right wing take a course of 
action that would oust them from Rwanda and lead to the institution of a Tutsi 
government? How did the extremist elements within the Habyarimana government 
miscalculate their ability to maintain power, co-opt the opposition Hutu political parties, 
and yet resolve the thorny Tutsi refugee issue? 
The source of these troubles lies not in ancient hatred between the two ethnic 
groups, but in the process of ethnic stratification that occurred first under the Tutsi 
kingdoms of the nineteenth century and was later institutionalized by the colonial 
authorities. This process placed the Tutsi above the more prevalent Hutu and subjugated 
them to the lower status of Rwandan society. It emplaced and reinforced a ranked ethnic 
society that carried over into the Hutu republics in a reverse fashion following 
independence. During his twenty-year reign, President Habyarimana used this process to 
10
 The crash of the presidential aircraft has been in fact theorized to have actually 
been a planned shoot down of the aircraft by members of the inner circle of the president, 
the Akazu, who were concerned that he "was finally going to comply with the provisions 
of the Arusha agreement" and thereby threaten their power bases and lifestyles. Whether 
or not President Habyarimana's death unleashed the ensuing genocide campaign against 
the Tutsis is unclear (Prunier) 
10 
enjoy the privileges of power and to maintain control over the country by using the Tutsi 
as a convenient scapegoat. According to Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama, 
Ethnicity, which the colonial masters had used to suit their convenience, 
was also used by the post-colonial leaders, who politicized and later 
militarized an ethnic ideology. Extremism was a deliberate measure to suit 
one section of the Rwandan society. The massacres were not a result of the 
spontaneous response by the people who so loved Habyarimana, and were 
pained by his death, and therefore acted to eliminate his killers...The 
genocide was planned and implemented.11 
B.       PRE-COLONIAL RWANDAN SOCIETY 
Rwanda's ethnic composition is the same today as it has been for centuries; that 
is, approximately 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa. It appears that 
the Twa, who occupy Rwanda's lowest socioeconomic position and inhabit the lowest 
levels of standing in Rwanda society, are probably the descendants of the area's original 
aboriginal hunter-gatherers. Unlike the aboriginal Twa, the Hutu were part of the greater 
Bantu expansion that migrated into Rwanda from West Africa a millennium ago. 
A major point of contention between the Hutu and Tutsi, has been the speed with 
which the pastoralist Tutsi settled in Rwanda. Did the Tutsi settle into Rwanda after a 
relatively rapid military conquest or did they arrive gradually, peacefully assimilate into 
the country, and eventually come to dominate certain sectors of Rwandan society? This 
11
 Joan Kakwenzire, and Dixon Kamukama, "The Development and 
Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994," in The Path of a Genocide, 
ed. Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 
pp. 90. 
11 
question would later be used as a propaganda point with the extremists making the 
pointed portrayal of the Tutsi as "foreign invaders." 
The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA) noted in its report on the 
international response to the genocide that the "establishment of direct Tutsi military rule 
and administration" followed their arrival.12 This establishment of Tutsi predominance 
occurred slowly and appears to have been the most aggressive with respect to the Tutsi 
Nyiginya clan that originated in the eastern portion of Rwanda. This movement displaced 
many autonomous pre-existing Hutu kingdoms in its march toward dominance. Still, the 
Hutu and the Tutsi lived amicably for centuries, cohabitating on the same hilltops, 
intermarrying, and even moving from one ethnic classification to another depending on 
their economic and marital status.13 
By most standard indicators, Des Forges notes that Rwandans were one "ethnic" 
group: 
Originally organized in small groups based on lineage or on loyalty to an 
outstanding leader, they joined in building the complex state of Rwanda. 
They developed a single and highly sophisticated language, Kinyarwanda, 
crafted a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and created a 
culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric.14 
12
 Danida, The International response to Conflict and Genocide; Lessons from the 
Rwanda experience, Study 1- Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, 
accessed September 18th 2000, available at 
ht1p://www.um.dk.danida/evalueringsrapporter/1997_rwanda/bookl.asp. 
13
 It is estimated by the historians David and Catherine Newberry in a paper 
presented to the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities, that "at least 25 per 
cent of Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their eight great grandparents. 
Looking back even further, the percentage with mixed ancestry would most likely exceed 
50 per cent." 
14
 Des Forges, pp. 31. 
12 
The mwami, as the central ruler of Rwanda, owned all the land and cattle in the 
country. He ruled the country through a complex layer of officials or chiefs that served to 
strengthen the grip of Tutsi domination at the highest/elite levels with Hutu participation 
only at the middle or lower levels. The bottom unit of these officials occurred at the 
hilltop level. The hill as the base unit of a district had three different chiefs: 
• The chief of the pastures, a Tutsi who ruled over the grazing lands that were a 
primary concern of cattle and thus the Tutsi position. 
• The chief of landholdings, generally a Hutu, who took care of land matters and 
agricultural issues, (hence the choice of a Hutu as the cultivators.) 
• The chief of men, who served as the ruler of men and as the primary military 
recruiter for the mwami, normally a Tutsi. 
A particular aspect of Rwandan society that provided a sort of bonding of the 
unequal status between Hutu and Tutsi but also between Tutsi was the ubuhake. The 
Danida study found the ubuhake was a patron/client relationship that "involved reciprocal 
bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services. It provided a place, a status, within 
a hierarchal system. The patron was mostly a Tutsi, but the client could be Hutu or Tutsi 
of inferior social status."15 As such, the only Tutsi that theoretically could not also be a 
client of the system was the mwami, but generally the system involved a Tutsi at the top 
and the Hutu at the bottom. 
The ubuhake highlighted the economic differences between the pastoralist cattle 
owning Tutsi and the agricultural farming Hutu, with cattle owning viewed as the higher 
level of status. French professor Gerard Prunier noted in his book that "for the Tutsi 
ideologues it was a mild practice amicably linking different lineages into a kind of 
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friendly mutual help contract. For the Hutu ideologues it was an ironclad form of quasi- 
slavery enabling the Tutsi masters to exploit the poor downtrodden Hutu."16 This feeling 
of quasi-slavery status to the Tutsi would continue to be amplified under the colonial 
system of indirect rule and would foster the growth of resentment towards the Tutsi that 
would explode at independence. 
Centralized Tutsi rule over a united Rwanda reached its climax during the reign of 
mwami (King) Kigeli IV Rwabugiri (1860-1895), and was the most active and conscious 
embodiment of the conquest/centralization/social standardization process.17 Under 
Rwabugiri, the mwami became the source and symbol of all authority in the politically- 
centralized state.18 From the time of mwami Rwabugiri until the monarchy was 
eventually abolished in 1961, the kingdom of Rwanda was a highly organized and 
stratified state.19 
This is not to say that all Rwanda was united under the mwami. Several 
autonomous Hutu kingdoms, primarily in the north and southwestern parts of the country, 
remained independent until their complete domination was enabled by colonial military 
expeditions between 1910 and 1920. This armed domination of the north generated 
strong animosities between the previous autonomous kingdoms and the central kingdom 
and fundamentally altered the political makeup of the country. 
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In consolidating his power base, Rwabugiri made efforts to undermine the power 
of elite Tutsi families by removing them from positions of authority and replacing them 
with his chosen personnel. The new political appointees were then beholden to him 
directly. This occurred, as noted in the Danida study, "notably in regions that previously 
had been relatively independent, thereby increasing the material resources available to the 
monarchy."20 
. An important result of the reign of Rwabugiri was the heightening of awareness 
of ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi. As Catherine Newberry explains: 
with the arrival of central authorities, lines of distinction were altered and 
sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tutsi assumed new hierarchical 
overtones associated with proximity to the central court and proximity to 
power. Later, when the political arena widened and the intensity of 
political activity increased, these classifications became increasingly 
stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation of 
cultural difference from Tutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with 
and eventually defined by inferior status.27 
C.        COLONIAL INFLUENCE ON THE ETHNIC MYTH 
When the Germans arrived in 1895, they found the pre-existing structures of the 
mwami Rutalindwa, the heir to the recently departed mwami Rwabugiri, and the 
structures of the autonomous kingdoms. This encouraged the colonial officials to utilize 
the existing native institutions through which to administer the territory, a policy of 
indirect rule. It also served their interests to have the mwami continue to enlarge the 
central kingdom and subjugate the remaining autonomous kingdoms and bring them 
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within the central kingdom. The premise from the eyes of the colonial authorities was to 
rule the colony at the least cost and generate the most profit.22 Using the administrative 
structures of the mwami served this purpose well, by reliving the need for a large number 
of colonial administrators. 
The Germans and the Belgians would further elevate Tutsi elites more rigid and 
self serving to serve their needs and the needs of the elite Tutsi class of the mwami. By 
the middle of the 20th Century, the Hutu were aware of the effects of the sharpened 
stratification, the ranked ethnic system, and the injustices inflicted upon them by both the 
Tutsi and the colonial authorities. Prunier stated that "the result of this heavy 
bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating 
the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an 
aggressively resentful inferiority complex."23 With the arrival of independence in the 
second half of the Twentieth Century, the Hutu, upon assuming political control of the 
country were not quick to forget the injustices brought about by this process. 
In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium to 
administer Rwanda. The Belgian authorities choose to administer the possession in the 
same indirect manner as the German authorities maintaining the system that had elevated 
the Tutsi elite above the more numerous Hutu. 
The colonial powers were unaware of the complexity and palace intrigue that 
existed within the circles of the Rwandan Tutsi elites/clans at the highest levels of the 
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Rwandan society. The actions of the Germans and Belgians authorities only served to 
heighten the distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi and elite Tutsi classes. This practice 
played into the hands of the Tutsi elites that were seeking to consolidate power. 
A second source of ethnic tension to arise due to colonial practices dealt with the 
perception of physical differences between the two ethnic groups. The colonial powers, 
both Germany and Belgium, embraced these supposed differences and utilized them as 
the basis for institutionalizing the ethnic stratification between the Hutu and the Tutsi. 
The OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) noted that this policy 
provided both sides with material to exploit: "The two groups themselves disagree 
profoundly on this issue, and each can find certain authorities to support their position."24 
Significant propaganda efforts by both Hutu and Tutsi have been directed at this 
issue, most prominently by the Hutu in the years following independence, and 
considerably accelerated in the final years of the Habyarimana regime.25 The 
Habyarimana regime would consistently portrayed the Tutsi as a form of evil invader to 
their Hutu lands, and sought every opportunity to vilify them as the cause of all national 
ills. 
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Another factor that influenced the colonial decision to work with the Tutsi elites 
was the European racist belief that the Tutsi were a superior and alien "race" in Rwanda. 
The complexity and advanced nature of the Tutsi society convinced the Europeans that 
they must have come from another region, probably Ethiopia. They suspected that the 
Tutsi must have conquered the lesser races in the country. These theories were backed up 
by the fact that the Tutsi were generally taller than the Hutu and had finer features, more 
characteristic of Europeans. To the European colonial authorities and missionaries, this 
placed the Tutsi higher on the evolutionary scale then the Hutu, making them a closer 
relation to the Europeans and thus more civilized. 
This sentiment was voiced by Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian Administrator in the 
1920s: 
The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to 
give them a great prestige vis-ä-vis the inferior races which surround .. .It 
is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, 
more spontaneous, more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved without 
ever daring to revolt.26 
The Belgian authorities did not understand the society they governed, and 
distorted indigenous practices to their serve own interests. In the process they furthered 
the animosity between groups and classes. A prime example of this occurred in the area 
of ubuletwa. In the pre-colonial period, the ubuletwa was a work/taxation obligation 
assigned by the mwami to individual communities. The individual communities could 
then choose an individual to fill their obligation as a whole. The Belgian authorities made 
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this obligation an individual responsibility thereby increasing the requirement for forced 
labor. The new obligation was resented because it benefited only the elites and the 
colonial authorities rather then the commune as it previously had done. 
Another illustration of the distortion of indigenous societal practices was the 
alteration of the local chiefly functions. The Belgian authorities decreed that the previous 
system of three chiefs was to be abolished in favor of a single chief system. This chief 
obviously tended to be a Tutsi. This further concentrated power in the hands of the Tutsi 
elites and accentuated the growing sense of ethnic division between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi. 
The Catholic Church further sharpened ethnic differences in the country. Because 
missionaries comprised a high percentage of the limited number of colonial authorities 
within the country, their voice and opinions carried considerable weight. The 
missionaries controlled the western educational process and heavily favored Tutsi youth 
at the expense of Hutu students. Many Hutu became Theology students. Theology was 
not viewed as a path to a civil service job. But it was a method to gain access to post- 
secondary education that they would otherwise be denied. 
Christianity also played a central part in Belgian machinations to control the 
mwami. In 1931, the Belgian authorities removed mwami Yuhi V Musinga, because he 
had sided with the Germans during the First World War and had not embraced 
Christianity. They replaced him with one of his sons. The son, who ruled as Muter III 
Rudahigwa, was much more amenable ruler to the Belgians. He was a mission educated, 
westernized, monogamous man, who converted to Christianity and consecrated his 
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country to the Catholic Church in 1946.27 With his ascension to the throne and 
conversion to Christianity, the road to power within the country now lay with those who 
embraced the church. 
The most notorious of Belgian colonial measures that institutionalized ethnic 
differences was the introduction of the identification card in 1933. The card carried a 
declaration of ethnicity that forever denoted the ethnic status of the individual. This 
ethnic declaration also was passed down through bloodlines, and perpetuated ethnic 
stratification. It gave the genocidaires of 1994 an easy method of identifying individuals 
for extermination.28 
Beginning first in the 1930s, the Catholic Church began to re-evaluate its support 
for the Tutsi elite. This process reflects changes occurring within the Rwandan Catholic 
Church hierarchy. This change was due to the large number of Hutu students that had 
studied theology and then entered the church. This served to add more indigenous Hutu 
priests to the local church. This practice altered the political nature of the local church. 
The church also began to recognize the inevitability of independence for the country 
following the close of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations 
system. 
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D.        INDEPENDENCE 
As political consciousness and "nationalist" sentiments grew in the 1950s, 
political demands were forming in terms of ethnicity. An important manifestation of this 
awareness of political ethnicity occurred in 1957 when a group of Hutu intellectuals, 
among them the future first President of independent Rwanda, Gregoire Kayibanda, 
published a document entitled, Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem 
in Rwanda. This document was drafted with the aim of influencing a visiting UN 
Trusteeship Mission but the DANIDA study found that it "attacked the whole concept of 
Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict 
between Hutu and Hamitic Tutsi."29 The document also was noted by the OAU IPEP, 
"was directed quite accurately against the "dual colonialism" of the Belgians and the 
Tutsi, expressed particular resentment toward the "political monopoly" of the Tutsi that 
had expanded into "an economic and social monopoly."30 
The use of the concept of race as a consideration of political concerns is 
significant in this document. Given that the entire colonial experience had been devoted 
to the elevation of one ethnic group over another as a superior race, it could only serve to 
stimulate animosity. It was clear that emerging political parties would be created along 
these cleavage lines, further institutionalizing the gulf between the two groups. 
In 1957, Kayibanda created the first political party, the Mouvement Social 
Muhutu (Hutu Social Movement or MSM), which in  1959 became the Parti du 
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Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (Party of the Movement and of the Hutu 
Emancipation or PARMEHUTU). This formation of the first political party was followed 
by the creation of multiple Tutsi parties ranging from the monarchist, anti-Belgian Union 
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) to the more moderate Rwandese Democratic Union 
(RADER). 
Interethnic violence along party lines soon broke out. The Belgian authorities 
along with the Catholic church fully supported the new Hutu movements. 
This ethnic based violence saw the first mass exodus of Tutsi refugees into 
neighboring countries of the Great Lakes region, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. Some 
of the Tutsi refugees immediately set up guerilla organizations, called the inyenzi or 
cockroaches by the Hutu, and conducted periodic attacks across the borders against the 
Hutu. These raids accomplished little but led to massive reprisals against those Tutsi still 
living within Rwanda. 
Belgium supported the idea of a referendum on self-government in late 1959. 
During the summer of 1960, the colonial authorities organized communal elections. 
These elections reversed the Tutsi control of government; placing 210 of 229 newly 
formed communes, controlled by Burgomestres, in the control of Hutu parties. The 
Kayibanda PARMEHUTU party won the largest percentage share of the elections. These 
new Burgomestres quickly picked up the habits of the old feudal rule and created their 
own Hutu clienteles.31 
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The Belgian colonial authorities and Kayibanda, in an effort to forestall possible 
UN action from the Trusteeship Committee, called an emergency meeting of the 
Burgomestres on January 28, 1961. At this meeting, the Democratic Republic of Rwanda 
was declared. Later, Parliamentary elections established a Hutu majority legislature along 
demographic lines. A referendum soon after rejected a return to a monarchy and endorsed 
the establishment of a republic, which was formally recognized in July 1962. 
Kayibanda became the first president of the new republic. His regime, which 
lasted until July 1973, was secretive, elitist, and authoritarian. The concept of a unified 
Hutu republic was a myth. Like those before and after him, Kayibanda's regime rested 
upon rule by a small elitist clan under the guise of the larger ethnic grouping. Effective 
Tutsi leadership was eliminated within the country during his regime through 
intimidation, arrest, physical violence, and extra-judicial killings.32 A strict quota system, 
affecting jobs and the educational system, was implemented to ensure that Tutsi were 
blocked from regaining the power they once held. 
Rwanda under Kayibanda became a de-facto one party state with PARMEHUTU. 
By 1972., growing divisions among Hutu sub-regional factions forced President 
Kayibanda to return to an emphasis on ethnic division to shore up his now shaky 
presidency. This practice had united the country at independence, drove out thousands of 
Tutsi, and firmly established his stature as president. 
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The methods employed failed and a new wave of inter-ethnic violence erupted in 
1973. This violence appeared linked to an explosion of Hutu/Tutsi fighting in 
neighboring Burundi. The violence was not contained to Hutu against Tutsi and it soon 
began to threaten the other elements of the Hutu elites, each vying for the rewards that 
power brings in the patrimonial system. In response to fears for their survival and sensing 
an opportunity to grab power, northern Hutu led by the National Defense Minister, Major 
General Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in a bloodless military coup on July 
5,1973. 
E.        THE HABYARIMANA REGIME 
When General Habyarimana seized power in his July 1973 coup, the people of 
Rwanda generally welcomed the shift in power. Prunier noted the change, "General 
Habyarimana had brought peace and stability to Rwanda. Like anything else, this had its 
price."33 The new president quickly moved to outlaw all political parties within the 
country and establish a totalitarian state. Within a year he relented only on the issue of 
political parties, forming his own party the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le 
Developpement (MRND). 
The Habyarimana regime was an authoritarian de jure one party system. The 
MRND was enshrined in the constitution as the only legally recognized political party. 
MRND control of the state was total and dissent was not tolerated, with threats and 
intimidation used as a control mechanism. This single party system was legitimized with 
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a constitutional article in 1978, mandating it as the party of the state, a core value of the 
country.34 
Every Rwandan citizen was required to be a member of the party, every political 
appointee, down to the lowest level to included the Burgomestres of every commune, was 
personally approved by President Habyarimana. This gave him an all-pervasive level of 
power over the country. It was the Burgomestres after all, who exercised immediate 
control over the population on a day-to-day basis. Through them, Habyarimana truly 
extended his control to the lowest levels of the populace. Thus the Rwandan state under 
Habyarimana was an uncharacteristically strong state, at least on some measures of 
capacity. 
The Habyarimana regime presided over a period of stable growth and peace for 
the next twelve years until 1985. A form of equilibrium existed between the Hutu elites 
and the Tutsi of the country and the inter-ethnic violence diminished greatly. Tutsi 
businessmen flourished in the private sector. They accepted the clear limits placed on 
their position within the Hutu dominated Rwandan society. Not a single Tutsi was a 
prefecture head or Burgomestres. Hutu officers dominated the military and they were 
even banned from marrying Tutsi women. 
The Rwanda of Habyarimana was initially a more economically open, mainstream 
African nation. Its growth and development were the envy of the Great Lakes region. It 
was during this period that Rwanda was nicknamed the "Switzerland of Africa" due in 
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part to its peaceful, stable, hardworking, reliable reputation. Habyarimana was a 
modernizing leader, well traveled and close with other members of the Francophonie. 
France supplanted Belgium as Rwanda's state patron. France and Rwanda signed a 
military and cooperation agreement in 1975.35 
Rwandan political tradition (going back to the old abami tradition) of having a 
small group of followers outside official structures to act as the sensory organs of the 
ruler, seeing and hearing at a level unavailable within official circles, were embraced by 
the northern Hutu with the presidency of Habyarimana. This practice cemented the 
patrimonial nature of the Habyarimana state. It relied heavily on narrow marital practices, 
within the commune level, to maintain clan loyalties and favor. Habyarimana's ascent to 
power after all was a revolt against the power and regional prestige of the south under 
Kayibanda that had seen the Hutu of the north diminished. 
President Habyarimana's inner circle was heavily weighted towards those who 
shared his northwestern regional roots. This concentration of power within a small 
regional patrimonial system took place over a number of years and eventually narrowed 
to two prefectures in the late 1980s.36 Prunier found that within this regional patrimonial 
system, would also take place a further refining of the regional interests where within 
each "regional mafia there was a tendency to create sub-units according to precise, more 
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narrowly defined geographical origin."37 The akazu was an example of a smaller clan 
based structure within a larger regional clan. 
President Habyarimana and his wife Mme Agathe were both from the 
northwestern prefecture of Gisenyi. Further patrimonial favors were broken down from 
within the prefecture to the communal level. President Habyarimana suffered from a lack 
of a respectable communal lineage. He was rumored to have been bora in Uganda. His 
familial line within the commune was not very respected. He lacked a true core of loyal 
followers and did not have the backing of a clan. 
Mme Agathe, on the other hand was a member of an important northern clan that 
had been one of the last autonomous Hutu kingdoms subjugated by the Belgians. There 
was considerable power and prestige associated with her family. It was her clan that 
provided much of the "loyal" base for the president. The President relied heavily on her 
and her familial connections and essentially became their prisoner.38 
It was from the patrimonial relationship surrounding Mme Agathe that le Clan de 
Madame, also known as the akazu or "little house" would arise, one of the most notorious 
of the right wing organizations. The akazu was comprised of three of Mme Agathe's 
brothers, a cousin, other close associates, and lesser associates including military officers. 
Members of this organization filled positions of authority at the center of power within 
Rwanda, and many of the excesses of the regime can be traced to it. The OAU IPEP 
found the group was central in "various kinds of illicit and corrupt activities, including 
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currency transactions and generous commissions on government contracts. Much 
development aid actually ended up in their [its] deep pocket."39 Members of the akazu 
were even rumored to have murdered a powerful potential successor to the presidency 
who was not one of their own, thus eliminating a threat to their power base. 
The Catholic Church was closely aligned with the state during the Habyarimana 
era. The church provided additional symbolic legitimacy to the state, especially in a state 
that was 60 percent Catholic. Church leaders were active on all levels of the state and 
political parties., Separation between church and state did not exist. This in turn 
facilitated church activities. 40 Having the church on his side provided President 
Habyarimana with an extra level of control over the populace. 
The fragility of the Habyarimana regime was exposed by the economic crisis that 
began after 1985. The OAU IPEP report noted that the countries "dependence on 
commodity markets controlled by powerful interests in rich countries took its toll in these 
years, when coffee, tea, and tin prices plummeted."41 Suffering, caused by the drop in 
commodity prices, effected every level of Rwandan society, and the dependence on cash 
crops meant that the ability to feed the populace was greatly affected: 
39
 OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, para. 5.18. 
40
,Ibid. para. 4.14-4.15. 
41
 Ibid. para. 5.3. 
28 
After decades of strict control and careful manipulation by one of Africa's 
most highly-centralized and well-organized states, the Rwandan people 
had earned a reputation for docility and deference to authority. Now, 
however, this considerably exaggerated submissiveness gave way to anger 
and protest.42 
Alison Des Forges found that when "confronted by the dramatic economic decline 
and the evidence of increasing corruption and favoritism on the part of Habyarimana and 
his inner circle, political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists began demanding 
reforms."43 
Pressure began to mount for President Habyarimana to open up the single party 
state to democratic reforms. Habyarimana agreed to discuss change in the summer of 
1990, appointing a commission that he envisioned would take two years to conduct its 
work, to study reform. The commission actually released its results within eleven months, 
in the summer of 1991. The commission advocated amending the constitution to allow a 
multi-party state, which Habyarimana reluctantly accepted. It was during this period that 
the RPF invaded the country. 
The ruling regime found itself caught in the trap of reliance on international 
financial assistance. A Structural Adjustment Program offered to the state under strict 
terms, by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September 1990, did 
not achieve the desired effects. The assistance in fact, achieved the reverse effects. 
Inflation rose immediately and the government was forced to cut programs drastically, 
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while fees for services were raised. With the advent of the economic crisis, intra-elite 
fissures were exposed in the Habyarimana government. 
As cronyism and favoritism of the Habyarimana regime towards the north grew 
more blatant, pressure began to mount from the southern Hutu of PARMEHUTU 
orientation, for a more representative government. This pressure also came from outside 
the country, led by the French which had maintained close ties with the President.44 Any 
move towards multi-party democracy would not suit the akazu and they quickly resorted 
to the policy of ethnic division, vilifying the Tutsi within the country as evil. Timing 
made this ploy more effective when in October 1990; the RPF, a Tutsi expatriate group 
from Uganda, invaded Rwanda. 
The first opposition political party in Rwanda formed within a month of the RPF 
invasion. President Habyarimana quickly renamed his ruling party, the Mouvement 
Revolutionaire National Pour le Developpement et la Democratic (MRND (D)), to reflect 
the new openness. On June 10, 1991, the constitution was officially changed to allow 
multiple political parties. 
Within months there was a flourish of political parties created, including the 
revival of the Hutu anti-Tutsi, Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) which was 
a reformation of the Kayibanda regional party PARMEHUTU. Another party to form was 
the Hutu, virulent anti-Tutsi, extremist party, the Coalition pour la Defense de la 
Republique (CDR). The CDR was nominally separate of Habyarimana's MNRD (D) but 
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appears more likely to be a vehicle for the MNRD (D) to espouse a harder, extremist line, 
too radical to support openly. 
The CDR was linked to the akazu and other various right wing organizations that 
were all to play key roles in the planning and conduct of the genocide to come. It was 
also responsible for the creation of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), 
the radical anti-Tutsi radio station that continually broadcast a message of hate and 
genocide in the months before and during the genocide. 
The reality of the new political system in Rwanda was noted by the OAU IPEP 
report. "The other new parties consisted largely of Hutu from outside the northwestern 
regions who had been cut out of the inner circles. Few observers failed to note that what 
distinguished the MRND from most of the new parties was that it had power, while the 
others wanted it."45 Multi party politics within Rwanda was just another way to compete 
for the benefits of power rather than a true search for solutions to the problems facing the 
country, such as the Tutsi refugee issue and the economic crisis. 
With the advent of opposition political parties, the next logical step for reform 
was to pressure Habyarimana for a true coalition government. The growing power of the 
opposition parties, demonstrated in their ability to mount massive street demonstrations. 
Protests placed the president under great pressure to accede to the demands. 
On March 14, 1992, following several politically motivated massacres, 
international pressure forced President Habyarimana to accept the formation of a multi- 
party government. A genuine coalition cabinet was formed, with premiership of the 
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government going to the opposition party, Mouvement Democratique Republicain 
(MDR), which was the largest, most active opponent of the ruling party. 
The ruling MRND (D) maintained nine cabinet positions but eleven others went 
to the opposition parties. Habyarimana maintained his position and presidential powers. 
This new cabinet was sworn in on April 7, 1992. The new opposition cabinet members 
immediately set about to exercise their new independent power in the government. 
The new government, with opposition members now in positions of authority, 
aggressively tried to reform the excesses and inequalities of the past and gain spoils for 
their regions. Attempts were made to minimize the influence of the powerful security 
force, the Service Central de Reseignements (SCR) by cutting up its various functions 
into different components and placing them under the control of various ministries. 
The consequence of these actions to reform the SCR, was however a restructuring 
of the SCR as an underground alliance with the Zero Network death squads. The Zero 
Network was a secret extremist organization and was comprised of both off duty FAR 
soldiers and militiamen of the MRND (D), and was highly linked to the akazu. 
The next step for the opposition parties was to aim at separating the MRND (D) 
from the state. Under Habyarimana's control, the state, and the MRND (D) were 
essentially the same. With this access, the MRND (D) had complete right to use all state 
owned properties and equipment, a valuable source of infrastructure for the party. Ending 
this access forced the party to compete on a level playing field with the other parties but 
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also brought home the message to the extremist factions within the government that 
control was being lost. 
In an effort to maintain control of the country, Habyarimana returned to a tried 
and true method to divert attention away from the countries domestic problems and unite 
the Hutu. He began to attack the Tutsi as the enemy of the country and the party. This led 
to a dramatic increase in anti-Tutsi violence. The OAU IPEP report made note of this 
strategy in its investigation; "It is clear that Habyarimana and his advisers immediately 
understood what the RPF and Uganda had just handed them-an opportunity to 
consolidate their eroding support and to mobilize international backing for the war the 
invaders had begun."46 
MRND officials had feared the development of the opposition parties from the 
start. Because they threatened the potential loss of control of the reigns of power.47 The 
MRND viewed the development of these opposition parties more along the lines of a 
defeat by an enemy rather then a political loss. The leaders of the party gave their tacit 
approval to use any means to combat the opposition. This led to increased violence 
against opposition party officials that forced the opposition parties to adopt violence 
themselves. 
All political parties began to organize youth wings that became increasingly 
involved in political violence. The MRND went the extra step in forming its youth wing, 
the Interahamwe into an actual militia. The MRND provided access to military training 
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for the Interahamwe beginning in 1992. The extremist CDR also formed a youth gang, 
the Impuzamugambi that worked with the Interahamwe in politically motivated attacks 
against their opposition. Violence against Tutsi and members of the opposition Hutu 
escalated through June 1994. 
In 1992 in Brussels, Belgian Professor Filip Reyntjens revealed the existence of 
and the political connections of the MRND (D) to the Zero Network. The leadership of 
the Zero Network, as previously noted, had a strong connection to the akazu. They 
included many of the names that played key roles during the genocide, to include 
Colonel Bagosora director of the defense ministry, the head of the military intelligence, 
as well as Mme Agathe's brothers. Another secret organization, the Amasasu (Bullets), 
was comprised of FAR officers that did not believe that the fight against the RPF was 
being carried out with sufficient energy. This group began to hand out weapons to the 
Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi.,48 
In August 1993, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTMLC) went on the 
air. It was created by extremists who believed the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, 
was too liberal. The founders of the station came from within the inner circles of the 
president. Certain advantages were provided RTMLC, which suggested links to the 
government. Among these were the ability to broadcast on the same frequency as Radio 
Rwanda during that station's off air period and access to an emergency back-up power 
48
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source. Personnel from the national station also were moved to fill positions at the new 
station. 
RTMLC quickly became a popular station because of its lively interactive format, 
which was a departure from the formal Radio Rwanda. The station became the 
mouthpiece of the extremists espousing an anti-Tutsi propaganda line devised by leading 
Hutu intellectuals. During the genocide, the station was essentially the sole source of 
news for most of the nation, and the sole interpreter of events. This was a valuable tool 
for spreading propaganda to the rural populace. 
The most important example of this new initiative by the coalition opposition 
members occurred in May 1992, when the new Foreign Minister met with the RPF in 
Uganda. This meeting resulted in direct negotiations that began in Paris during June. 
When the news of this first contact became public, it caused concern within the extremist 
ranks. These discussions would lead to the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 
1993. 
F.        THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT 
The RPF was a rebel organization started in Uganda by Rwandan Tutsi who had 
fled the 1959 Hutu persecution. Some of the rebels had been bom in Rwanda, others had 
never been inside the country having been born in exile. With the political situation of 
Uganda unsettled in the late 1980s, the fledgling government of Milton Obote chose to 
make the Rwandan refugees a scapegoat for Ugandan problems. This drove many of the 
refugees to join Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight 
Obote. 
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The Rwandans proved to be avid fighters. Several Tutsi rose to hold high 
positions in Museveni's NRA, which threw out the Obote regime in 1986. Unfortunately, 
internal pressures within Uganda caused Museveni to cast his Rwandan compatriots aside 
to maintain his hold on the fragile Ugandan society. When Tutsi members of the 
Ugandan Army realized that they were not welcome in their adopted home, they formed 
the RPF in 1987 and began to contemplate returning to their own homeland. On October 
1,1990, they invaded Rwanda from Uganda. 
The timing of the RPF invasion played into the hands of the Habyarimana regime 
and the right wing factions. It allowed the president to play again the ethnic card, 
portraying the RPF as the returning foreign invader intent upon stealing Hutu lands. The 
effect stifled the advances made by the opposition political parties and enhanced the 
standing of those on the right wing. According to the OAUIPEP: 
The timing of the RPF invasion lent credence to their divisive strategy. 
Habyarimana was demonstrating, however reluctantly, a new openness 
towards both multiparty democracy and the exiles. This bolstered his 
sagging popularity and undermined the RPF's credibility as a more 
attractive alternative.49 
The RPF struck with a relatively large and well-organized force, made up of 
veterans of the Ugandan civil war and later conflicts with rebel movements in Northern 
Uganda. Their leaders were well trained and highly respected. The invasion, was not 
officially supported by the Museveni Ugandan government, although it certainly enjoyed 
its tacit approval and support. 
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The initial RPF foray failed to produce the desired results. On the second day of 
the invasion Major General Fred Rwigyema, the highly respected leader of the RPF, was 
killed. The Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) offered effective resistance that stalled the 
military advance. The expected mass support by the populace never materialized. On the 
contrary, the invasion hardened support for the Hutu hardliners giving increased 
credibility to their ethnic strategy. Massive internal displacement of Hutu peasants away 
from the war zones, provided further support to the anti-Tutsi sentiments. These internal 
displacements proved to be a fertile breeding ground for anti Tutsi extremists and for the 
Hutu militias in the 1990s. 
France provided military support to the Habyarimana regime immediately 
following the invasion and continued to provide support through the first months of the 
genocide and reportedly into June 1994. Direct support was not supposed to be part of the 
assistance, but circumstantial evidence suggests that the French military forces and 
security services played more then a passive role at times. Motivations for French support 
are murky, among them was a purported desire to halt the spread of an "Anglophone" 
sphere of influence within central Africa represented by Museveni and Paul Kagame, the 
new leader of the RPF, who did not speak French. 
The RPF was nearly defeated by November 1990. Kagame, who had been outside 
the region attending a US Army school at Fort Leavenworth, returned and rallied the 
remnants of the RPF righting forces. He led a successful retreat across the Ugandan 
border, with the complicit approval of President Museveni. The retreat provided Major 
Kagame the time needed to escape with the remnants of the original force, recruit, re- 
37 
equip, and train for further operations. The civil war settled into a protracted conflict, 
broken by multiple cease-fire agreements over the next three and half years. 
G.       THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS 
Efforts to resolve the war began almost immediately after the RPF invasion of 
1990. Within days, the Belgian government made the initial overtures to facilitate 
discussions of the refugee issue, which had been a long-standing matter of contention 
between President Habyarimana and Uganda. The French government, noted Howard 
Adelman in a paper for the OAU IPEP report, placed the most pressure on the 
Habyarimana regime to negotiate concluding that, "the RPF might win militarily but 
[could not win] politically. The government could not win militarily, though it might 
command the numbers to win politically. A negotiated settlement was the best way for 
France to salvage its interests in Rwanda."50 
The French remained committed to the Habyarimana regime and the role that it 
represented as part of the Francophone sphere of influence in Africa. French military 
forces deployed to Rwanda immediately after the October invasion personally supported 
the Habyarimana regime. In the opinion of many in the French military establishment, 
any attempt by the French government to abandon the Habyarimana regime was 
equivalent to high treason.51 
Negotiations between the government and RPF went nowhere during 1991. 
Opposition members of the new coalition government boldly decided in June 1992, to act 
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without the participation of Habyarimana's ruling MRND (D) and meet directly with the 
RPF in Brussels. An agreement reached there on the technical modalities of the peace 
process led to comprehensive talks in Arusha, Tanzania. The members of the Rwandan 
opposition party delegation and the RPF, acting without the participation of the 
Habyarimana MRND (D) faction of the government, signed an initial cease-fire on July 
14,1992. 
The announcement of the cease-fire agreement did not sit well with the 
Habyarimana hard liners. The fact that the future peace negotiations in Arusha were 
going to be conducted by members of the opposition Hutu elements, meant that the 
Habyarimana faction would not be able to dominate the agenda or terms. 
At Arusha, a pattern quickly emerged. The Habyarimana regime, represented by 
the MRND (D), and closely monitored by Colonel Theoneste Bagosora a high ranking 
member of the akazu, would make concessions at the negotiating table. President 
Habyarimana, under pressure from his hard line factions, would later publicly retract 
these concessions. 
The feeling among the MRND (D) was that their opinion was not being heard at 
the negotiating table. The opposition factions, flexing their newly gained sense of 
independence and power, were pursuing their own path toward peace. This led the hard 
liners to search for a final solution. During this period, plans for the eventual genocide 
campaign were formulated by the loose coalition of the extreme right based in the CDR, 
and the emergent umbrella organization, Hutu Power.52 
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It increasingly appeared as if President Habyarimana was actually considering 
conciliation with the RPF at the negotiations. Prunier noted: 
In the short term, the extremist's main preoccupation was how to stop the 
growing dynamics of peace both in the country and at Arusha. The MRND 
(D) kept protesting against the lack of consultation concerning the 
negotiations while the CDR, in a more aggressive style, was 
demonstrating in the streets and fighting it out with the MDR and PSD 
militants.53 
Actual negotiations in Arusha, facilitated by the OAU and the President of 
Tanzania, made remarkable headway over time given the obstacles presented by the 
Habyarimana regime. In rapid succession, agreements were reached on: 
• The principle, and creation of the rule of law; 
• the creation of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG); 
• the reintegration of refugees into Rwanda. 
• The final issue necessary to resolve pertained to the restructuring of the armed 
forces and integration of the Tutsi soldiers of the RPF. The RPF demanded 50 
percent of the officer billets while the FAR, unwilling to forfeit its dominance of 
the officer corps and the attendant prerogatives of power, was not willing to give 
more than 20 percent. The final agreement saw the RPF demands for 50 percent 
of the officer billets, supported by the Tanzanians in a break from their neutral 
position, win out.54 
It was a reflection of the confusion and lack of consensus on the part of 
the government negotiators that they were prepared to make such a 
concession, and it was at the least imprudent for the RPF to have insisted 
on these terms despite much friendly advice to the contrary.55 
On August 4, 1993, President Habyarimana reluctantly signed the Arusha 
Accords, as the documents were now aptly called. 
53
 Ibid. pp. 170. 
54
 Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process," pp. 143. 
55
 OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, para. 8.12. 
40 
In retrospect, the Arusha Accords achieved the opposite of their intended 
purposes. The OAU PEP believes that the search "for ethnic equity and democracy, the 
negotiations succeeded in persuading the akazu that unless it acted soon, its days of 
power were numbered."56 They would be the losers in the BBTG arrangement that would 
minimize the grip of a limited regionally based elite. This made them all the more 
desperate and dangerous. 
The successes of the Arusha Accords were predicated on, as one expert explained 
to the OAU IPEP, "a tri-polar landscape: the Habyarimana party, the new parties, and the 
RPF,"57 This left the hard line factions out of the new government. Perhaps this was 
naive. Other factors also would conspire to ensure the failure of the accords. The limited 
mandate and the delay in the arrival and of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) force until December undermined the accords. The October assassination in 
Burundi of the democratically elected Hutu President by the Tutsi dominated army also 
hurt the prospects for peace. The inability to deal with Hutu Power and the increasing 
polarization of the country doomed the accords to failure.58 
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III.    RWANDAN OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION 
Following the signing of the Arusha Accords, the RPF and the Hutu opposition 
parties had made significant gains with the agreement. The Habyarimana ruling circle 
and the members of the FAR, however, would have suffered a loss of power and prestige 
if the provisions of the accords had been implemented fully. 
This chapter, explores two developments that spoiled the accords. The first was 
the Habyarimana regime, specifically, the President, and his inner circle, and the political 
parties associated with them, including the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique 
(CDR). The other spoiler were the FAR officers and the Hutu enlisted soldiers that stood 
to lose their secure positions with demobilization brought by the accords. The political 
elites and the military stood to lose prerogatives and power at the expense of the peace. 
In retrospect, according to the OAU IPEP, the Arusha Accords achieved the 
opposite of their intended objectives. "Searching for ethnic equity and democracy, the 
negotiations succeeded in persuading the akazu that unless it acted soon, its days of 
power were numbered."59 The akazu would be the losers in the BBTG arrangement that 
would minimize the power of a limited, regionally based elite. This fact made them all 
the more desperate and dangerous. 
A.        RWANDAN ELITES 
What led the Hutu extremist factions to abandon the Arusha process? The 
evidence strongly suggests that someone or some group planned the campaign for several 
years following the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in 1990. If the suggestion of right 
wing complicity is indeed true, then why, when confronted with increasing international 
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pressures to open the Habyarimana government to opposition parties, did the right wing 
take a course of action that would oust them from Rwanda and lead to the institution of a 
Tutsi led government in Kigali? How did the extremist elements within the Habyarimana 
government miscalculate their ability to maintain power, co-opt the opposition Hutu 
political parties, and yet resolve the thorny Tutsi refugee issue? 
The achievement of the Arusha Accords presented the ultimate challenge to the 
power of the Hutu extremists within the Habyarimana circle. The accords appeared to 
have a achieved a comprehensive agreement on all the major issues. A major component 
was the establishment of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) where power 
was to be shared amongst three forces: Habyarimana's MRND (D), the RPF, and a block 
of opposition parties. Notably excluded from the BBTG was the CDR. The RPF refused 
to allow their inclusion viewing them as too extreme and largely responsible for the anti- 
Tutsi violence and propaganda since the October 1990 invasion. President Habyarimana 
was to remain as the President of the nation, but the real power would reside with the 
Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers. 
While Arusha appeared to be a very comprehensive peace agreement, from the 
perspective of the hardliners: 
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they were the big losers at Arusha. The agreement would seal their fate 
unless they took drastic action to re-establish their supremacy. The more it 
appeared that power and the limited spoils of office would have to be 
shared not only with other Hutu parties, but also with the RPF itself, the 
more determined were the akazu insiders to share nothing with anyone. 
The akazu occupied key positions in the Presidential Guard, FAR and both 
MRND and CDR political parties, and they controlled the Interahamwe 
and Impuzamugambi militias as well as the radio station RTLMC. They 
were set to play their spoiler role with a vengeance, and now moved to 
accelerate their plans.60 
Between August 1993 and April 1994, the world of Rwandan politics increasingly 
split into two camps, those for peace and compromise, and those that progressively more 
viewed the entire process as a threat to their existence. During this period, a 
comprehensive propaganda campaign was mounted both through extremist controlled 
newspapers, and through the infamous RTMLC. The object of the campaign was to both 
psychologically undermine the position of the Tutsi within the country and to increase the 
animosity of the general Hutu population against the Tutsi. 
The extremist elements worked hard through the media and through personal 
speeches to rally their forces. Their intent was to demonize any parties that were not 
either a member of the MRND (D) or the CDR. If one was not a member or supporter of 
these organizations, then one was obviously a supporter of the enemy was the message 
consistently delivered. 
Another important phase in the consolidation of the extremists was the 
militarization of ethnicity. The youth wings, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, were 
provided paramilitary training by the army and were then used in political assassinations 
60
 OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, para. 8.15. 
45 
and intimidations. Large numbers of internally displaced Hutu were recruited out of the 
refugee camps for militia training with little attention paid to any sort of screening 
criteria. 
President Habyarimana came under intense international pressure to implement 
the provisions of the accords, while facing the clear internal pressure of his inner circle to 
not compromise lest they lose their power. With the events of April-June 1994, it is clear 
that the extremists within the government felt as if they had nothing to lose by their 
actions. 
B.       FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISE (FAR) 
In an ethnically polarized environment such as Rwanda, according to Donald 
Horowitz in his book on ethnic conflict, "the military is both a resource and an object of 
ethnic conflict."61 The ethnic composition of the military becomes an important issue due 
to its relationship with the actual societal make-up. The FAR had by 1990, at least at the 
elite ends of the officer corps, became a reflection of the regional interests that had come 
to dominate the government. It had not served as an integrating institution for the 
country. 
The FAR played a key role in the process of vilifying the Tutsi within Rwanda. In 
this task the FAR functioned as a rallying tool within the Hutu ranks, helping to exclude 
the Tutsi or Twa portion of the population from participating in the Rwandan political 
society. 
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The military reinforced the ethnically divisive politics of the Habyarimana 
regime: 
The skewed composition of regimes and officer corps reinforces the 
apparent importance of ethnicity, facilitates the interactions of officers 
(including conspiratorial interactions) on an ethnic basis, and may also 
increase the tendency for politicians and officers to view each others 
actions as ethnically motivated.62 
The officer corps sought ties with the regimes elites and flourished under the 
racially divisive environment of the Habyarimana reign of power. 
In 1973, President Habyarimana was Major General Habyarimana, the highest- 
ranking officer in the Rwandan Army of the Kayibanda republic. In July ofthat year, he 
seized control of the government during a coup and proceeded to rule for the next 21 
years. As President, Habyarimana maintained the role as the Commander in Chief of the 
FAR. In this capacity, he ensured that officers in elite billets, such as the Presidential 
Guard, the Para-Commandos, and the Reconnaissance Battalions, were loyal to him. He 
achieved this by selecting officers, with regional loyalties to his wife and to himself, for 
promotion and command. Under the Arusha Accords, the president would retain his 
position as the Commander in Chief, but the function would largely become a ceremonial 
billet, with the real power provided to the new Prime Minister. 
The future prospects of the FAR of the Habyarimana regime were closely allied 
with that of the president. Officers in command of the elite units or who held important 
billets in the Defense Ministry had ties with the akazu. An individual's advancement 
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within the army depended on ties with the northwestern regional. This patronage system 
extended the reach of the President. 
Initially, the officer corps appeared to be relatively competent and in control of 
the military. Professional military links with France helped to foster this level of 
competency. France had long sought links between itself and the armies of the 
Francophone zone. Many officers' received staff training at French military schools. The 
1975 Technical Military Assistance Agreements (TMAA) provided for French military 
training to army units. Later, this assistance would take a more ominous turn. 
Immediately after the 1990 invasion by the RPF, the FAR began to undergo a 
massive expansion. The expansion saw the relatively small professional army increase 
from a number around 5,200 in October 1990, to over 15,000 by mid 1991, and 30,000 
by the end of 1991. The size of the FAR peaked around 50,000 by the time the Arusha 
negotiations began.63 France was more then happy to help solve the issue of equipping 
the vastly increased army.64 
Expansion of the FAR created an obvious need for a source of manpower. The 
burgeoning population of the country, coupled with both a lack of job prospects or 
opportunity to own land and the cumulative effect of the anti-Tutsi propaganda efforts, 
led sufficient numbers of young men into the army. Des Forges made note of this in the 
Human Rights Watch report. "If some idealists enlisted to 'fight the feudalists', most of 
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those who joined did so in order to have an opportunity to eat, drink and loot since pay 
was minimal and irregular."65 
Economic factors led to a minor mutiny of the army in 1992. This occurred after 
initial hints at the upcoming peace discussions in Arusha became public. The mutiny was 
based on fears that the army would be demobilized once peace emerged. The MRND (D) 
and the CDR fed the rumors of less then desirable, alternative jobs to be provided the 
demobilized forces, such as the clearing of swamps. This practice served a purpose in its 
own right as a component of the anti Tutsi propaganda, giving the soldiers an incentive to 
fight the rebels. 
The Arusha Accords agreement, on the structure of the new Rwandan National 
Army, failed to anticipate the impact of the proposed restructuring. This aspect of the 
peace discussions proved to be the last area in which an agreement was reached. 
In negotiating the military aspects of the accords, it was in the interests of the 
Habyarimana government to maintain both a large army that retained a larger percentage 
of FAR troops then RPF forces. The FAR's obvious desire was to maintain the higher- 
ranking positions within the new force The structure of a large army meant a 
corresponding need for a large officer corps. 
For the RPF, a smaller force structure for the new national army would allow, via 
achieving a force balance of 40 percent of the enlisted ranks allotment to RPF soldiers, to 
maintain a sense of security with regard to survival should the peace process fail. During 
the negotiations, the RPF used an economics argument that the country would not require 
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a large standing army, to negotiate a smaller force size that was more favorable to their 
needs. Given the state of the Rwandan economy at the time and the true lack of an 
external threat, the argument was accepted. To justify a larger standing army would 
require an external threat that did not exist. 
The composition of the officer corps proved to be difficult area to achieve a 
negotiated settlement. Given the level of power, access, and prestige that the elite levels 
of the FAR had enjoyed within the Habyarimana government, and the akazu, the FAR 
officers stood to lose the most form the accords. The ultimate acceptance of a 50/50 ratio 
of FAR to RPF officers in the new army greatly favored the RPF. This ratio meant the 
level of power that Hutu officers enjoyed would be reduced. 
The Arusha negotiations settled on a ratio of 60 percent of the total of the new 
armies enlisted ranks were to be comprised of FAR forces, with the remaining 40 percent 
from the RPF forces. This ratio presented the FAR forces with the unpleasant prospect of 
demobilizing forces, and allowed the RPF to bring over its entire force into the new 
army with no need for demobilization. The issue of demobilizing a significant portion of 
the FAR forces was an unpleasant proposition given the lack of desirable job 
opportunities available. 
The FAR would lose power with a peaceful settlement to the civil war. For the 
leaders of the army, their access and prerogatives of power would diminish under the 
Broad Based Transitional Government. The leaders would confront a smaller chain of 
command and have to share military authority with RPF. The enlisted ranks of the FAR 
would also suffer greatly. They would be required to demobilize a great number of troops 
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who were just happy to be employed. The release of these soldiers who held extremist 
views from active duty, only created problems for the peace process and undermined the 
chances that it would succeed. 
C.       THE GENOCIDE CAMPAIGN BEGINS IN EARNEST 
On April 6, 1994, the entire Arusha process was burned in the ashes of the 
presidential jet near Kigali. The hard liners were free to initiate their plan to dominate the 
local political scene. 
Prior coordination and planning was evident. Within hours of the downing of the 
president's plane Prunier notes, "there were already Interahamwe roadblocks everywhere 
in town (Kigali) and houses were being searched."66 The extremist owned radio station, 
Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), began to broadcast messages 
inciting the Hutu populace to avenge the death of our President and provided instructions 
and directions to locate victims.67 The Presidential Guard began methodically killing. 
The death lists had been distributed to the future killers, who acted in coordinated and 
systematic ways to catch their victims.68 In a move calculated to force the withdrawal of 
the Belgian contingent in UNAMIR, FAR forces killed and mutilated ten Belgian 
paratroopers assigned to guard the Prime Minister. 
On April 8, the RPF launched an offensive from the northeast, reaching Kigali by 
the 10th. General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UNAMIR force, attempted to 
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negotiate a cease-fire between the warring parties, but the message from the RPF was 
clear. According to Prunier: 
There will be no negotiations with these criminals. The war was now on, 
but it was not the war which was killing most of the people. It was the 
enormous wave of civilian massacres now gathering momentum and 
sweeping right across the country. It was in fact a genocide.69 
TV coverage of the horror was not being reported outside of Rwanda. Prunier 
found that members of the print media were liberally documenting the disaster, but "in 
Western society events not seen on a TV screen do not exist."70 Among western 
governments, the events were known and in fact, had been foretold previously by the 
UNAMIR mission. The Western governments chose to ignore the human rights abuses in 
hopes of forcing a return to the Arusha Accords, and thereby avoiding the necessity of 
intervention to stop the violence. 
The successes of the Arusha Accords had been predicated on, as one expert 
explained for the OAU IPEP, "a tri-polar landscape: the Habyarimana party, the new 
parties, and the RPF," leaving the hard line factions out of the new government. 71 
Perhaps this was naive. Other factors would conspire to ensure the failure of the accords. 
The delay in the arrival until December and limited mandate of the UN Assistance 
Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) force, and the October assassination in Burundi of the 
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democratically elected Hutu President by the Tutsi dominated army helped end the 
accords. 
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IV.  INTERNATIONAL OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION 
In his article on "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," Steven John Stedman 
notes the limitations of custodians for the peace process that are completely fitting to the 
case of Rwanda. Stedman notes: 
a strategy that may be the best from a perspective of solely managing a 
conflict may not be the best for a policy maker considering a range of 
interests. This is certainly true for U.S. policy makers when it comes to 
conflict resolution in small, unimportant (to U.S. national interests), and 
faraway countries. Even the UN considers its actions in light of its 
organizational interests and the need to protect the reputation and 
institution of peacekeeping.72 
Stedman lays out the rationale for the inactions of both the United States and the 
UN with regard to Rwanda, which led to the collapse of international will in confronting 
the actions of extremists within Rwanda. This chapter discusses the reasons behind this 
failure to acknowledge the responsibility that each party held in dealing with the 
Rwandan civil war. 
Another limitation that Stedman discusses, is the potential liability that a patron of 
a spoiler brings to the process. Again, with regard to Rwanda, there is no greater 
illustration of the liabilities that a patron can bring to the peace process than French 
actions with regard to their support of Rwanda. France and her representatives unfailingly 
supported President Habyarimana both against the RPF with soldiers, arms and money. 
The French wanted to continue to influence the region and maintain a Francophone zone 
within Africa. 
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A.        ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
The Organization of African Unity has been the premier intergovernmental 
organization in Africa. The OAU is an organization that must answer to the individual 
heads of its member states: the supreme organ of the OAU is the Assembly of the Heads 
of States and Government (AHG). When the OAU was formed in 1963, one of the 
principal bedrocks of the organization was the recognition of state. The acceptance of the 
inviolability of postcolonial borders was viewed as an entrenchment of the new African 
states. Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt note this point in their assessment of the 
OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. "African 
countries had chosen to create an organization based on political and economic 
cooperation rather than on supranationalism."73 
This bedrock principle hampered the ability of the organization to act effectively 
in matters of conflict resolution. The record of the organization, stated Amare Tekle, "in 
conflict resolution has been largely dismal. This is a reflection of the structural 
weaknesses of the organization."74 From its inception, the organization concentrated its 
limited efforts in conflict management on interstate conflicts. No provisions for a true 
conflict prevention capacity within the organization were included. It would be difficult 
to view the OAU's overall performance at securing the peace and security of Africa in 
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the thirty-year period culminating in the 1993 creation of the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, and Resolution with any level of enthusiasm. Several factors 
account for this: 
• The limitations of the OAU's mandate. 
• Lack of political will of the member states. 
• Limitations of the OAU conflict management institutions. 
• Lack of experience and capacity in conflict management areas. 
• Lack of sufficient financial resources. 
• International politics. 
Following the RPF invasion in October 1990, the OAU was incapable of 
intervening successfully. Having failed to address the long-standing problem of the 
Rwandan refugees in the neighboring Great Lakes nations, the OAU was unable to act 
from a base of moral authority. In addition, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was the 
acting chair of the OAU at the time. Museveni was viewed by the Habyarimana regime as 
the true backer of the RPF and thus the de-facto invader of the Rwanda. Any involvement 
of President Museveni was accordingly viewed as less than neutral by Habyarimana and 
his regime. Correspondingly, the de facto leader of the Great Lakes region Mobuto Sese 
Seko of Zaire, was a supporter of the Habyarimana regime and his involvement in the 
process also was suspect. 
The tendency of the OAU was to fall back on mediation as its primary method of 
dealing with the crisis. This was essentially the limit of its conflict resolution capabilities. 
The refugee problem was recognized in early discussions but its initiatives went nowhere. 
The OAU Secretary-General did manage to facilitate a cease fire agreement in March 
1991, that was to be monitored by a neutral military observer team under the supervision 
of the OAU Secretary-General, as a prelude to the deployment of the a full-blown 
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African peacekeeping force.75 This initiative immediately ran into problems with the 
composition of the team and mutual suspicions about the motivations of the members. 
Another problem was the Habyarimana regime's tendency to renege on commitments, 
specifically in this case to allow the RPF members of the neutral observer team free 
access to the country. 
In July 1992, the OAU and the President of Tanzania orchestrated a meeting in 
Arusha, which would lead to the Arusha Accords. The priority of OAU negotiators at 
Arasha was to arrange an agreement that would halt the civil war. It was believed that a 
halt to the fighting would enable progress to be facilitated on other key issues such as 
power sharing, refugee return, integration of the armed forces, democracy and transitional 
government. Focusing on these narrow immediate goals blinded the negotiators to the 
reality that the Habyarimana regime, and the political parties associated with the regime, 
would not adhere to an agreement that challenged their control and power over the 
country. The result of this focus the OAU JPEP found, was as "a result, no direct action 
was taken against those conducting the anti-Tutsi pogroms with the support of the inner 
circle around President Habyarimana."76 
Achieving an agreement that would halt the civil war also was viewed as the 
prelude to the involvement of the UN. Although it had been agreed that during the initial 
1992 cease fire agreement that a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), acting under 
the supervision of the Secretary-General of the OAU, would verify and control the cease 
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fire, the OAU deferred to the UN to act as the principle guarantor of regional peace and 
security. Given the clear evidence already available of western withdrawal from African 
peacekeeping missions and the marginalization of Africa within the Security Council, this 
appears to have been a presumptuous and unwise decision. This grave miscalculation was 
fulfilled by the insufficient mandate and backing that the UNAMIR force received. 
B.        THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nation's Independent Inquiry into the actions ofthat body in Rwanda 
found that "the overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during 
the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to 
take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the 
genocide."77 The UN failed in its responsibility to the Rwandan people. The failure of 
the organization to act appropriately exposes the structural weaknesses of the 
organization in the post Cold War international society. 
The breakdown of the organization in this crisis is a failure of the Secretariat and 
the Security Council functions of the UN. The Independent Inquiry placed great emphasis 
on the inadequate mandate provided to the UNAMIR mission, but the Security Council 
was the body that set the mandate. The Secretary General, through the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which falls under the Secretariat, controls the day-to- 
day functioning of a peacekeeping mission. This is where the breakdown of the mission 
occurred. 
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The UN Charter is the preeminent source of international law today. Paragraph 1 
of article 1 Article states that the purposes of the United Nations are, "to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measure for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace.. .."78 
The major problem that the UN, as a post Cold War organization, has had to 
confront is how to balance the ideals of Article 1(1) with the realities contained in Article 
1(7). This paragraph lays out the primacy of the sovereign rights of individual states. 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII."79 At the time of the drafting of the Charter, conflict was largely interstate in nature. 
With the rise in intra-state conflicts and elevation of human rights as a major issue of 
international concern in the post Cold War era, the UN has had a more difficult time 
balancing these provisions with action. 
The UN Charter assigns primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security to the Security Council by virtue of Article 2(4). In the 
discussions to create the UN, the victorious allied powers of World War II prepared and 
dominated the agenda. A. Leroy Bennett states in his book on international organizations, 
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the "big powers, it was felt, should have positions of authority on the Security Council 
commensurate with their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and security."80 
The advent of the Cold War soon after the birth of the UN spelled an end to the 
collaborative spirit among the great powers, and revealed the weakness in the Security 
Council's make-up and voting procedures. Superpower animosities and the role of 
East/West client states conflict reduced the Council to a perpetual stalemate. A United 
States initiative launched in the early 1950's, known as the "Uniting for Peace 
Resolution," enabled the western permanent members of the council to bypass the 
Security Council stalemate, enabling a vote for an emergency meeting of the General 
Assembly. This procedure well worked well for the West until the 1970's and the rise of 
the third world anti-west Soviet supported movement in the General Assembly. 
The UN's dismal record of involvement in Rwanda can be traced in large part to 
the difficulties it had encountered in its Somalia operation (UNOSOM). The complexities 
involved with taking the Somalia mission from the initial Chapter VI humanitarian 
assistance operation to the later Chapter VII peace building operation proved to a far 
greater task then anyone had envisioned or contemplated. This soured the council on 
future forceful intervention into African civil wars. 
With the signing in August 1993 of the Arusha Accords, the Security Council 
hoped that a peace operation in Rwanda would be a winner.81 In retrospect it is clear that 
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the UN's intelligence gathering capacity failed to warn the council of the extreme 
reluctance President Habyarimana exhibited in signing the Arusha Accords. The UN 
report on its actions recognized this as a critical mistake. "The United Nations mission 
was predicated on the success of the peace process. There was no fall-back, no 
contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed."82 
The UNAMIR mission was counted on by the negotiators at Arusha to be the 
guarantor of the fragile peace in Rwanda. The UNAMIR mission suffered from the 
unwieldy political workings of the Security Council and the backlash of the UNOSOM 
mission. The size of the UNAMIR force contingent was an immediate source of debate. 
A UN military expert recommended a force size of 8,000 men, General Dallaire asked for 
4,500, and the United States recommended a force of 500. It was not until October 5, that 
a force of approximately 2,500 was approved for the mission. The UNAMIR force next 
suffered from a delay in funding. They arrived ill equipped to serve in their role and were 
undersupplied once the genocide commenced. 
In another nod to the UN experience in Somalia, the Security Council decided to 
place clear limits on the UNAMIR mandate. As a result, the mandate plainly deviated 
from the role as envisioned in the actual Arusha Accords. Several key considerations had 
been weakened, including notably the premise that UNAMIR would guarantee overall 
security in Rwanda. The mandate restricted UNAMIR from assisting in the search and 
recovery of arms caches and the neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country as 
called for in the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR as established, notes Des Forges, could only 
82
 United Nations Secretariat, III. Conclusions, para.. 2. 
62 
"contribute to security, and not throughout the country, but only in the city of Kigali."83 
These points were to be key as the situation in Rwanda eroded. 
General Dallaire, appointed as the UNAMIR force commander, arrived in 
Rwanda on October 22, 1993 with an advance party of twenty-one personnel. Jacques 
Roger Booh-Booh, former Foreign Minister of Cameroon, appointed by Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as his Special Representative in Rwanda to represent the 
diplomatic issues, arrived on November 23. Over the next few months, these two UN 
officials reported widely divergent analysis of the events occurring within Rwanda.84 
General Dallaire submitted a draft set of rules of engagement (ROE) to the DPKO 
on November 23. He expressed concern that the UNAMIR force might be required to 
assist the local civil authorities in maintaining law and order. In paragraph 17 of the draft 
ROE the General was explicit that UNAMIR would need to act vigorously if members of 
the UNAMIR mission were confronted with evidence of "ethnically or politically 
motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally 
require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them."85 UN Headquarters never 
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responded to the draft ROE and they were tacitly considered to be in effect by the 
UNAMIR staff.«« 
As the humanitarian and political situation began to unravel within the country, 
evidence of a genocide campaign began to mount. Booh-Booh's dispatches back to 
headquarters used language that appeared to portray the RPF as the guilty party to 
transgressions of the accords while downplaying any appearance of impropriety by the 
Habyarimana regime. General Dallaire was emphatic about the need for more direct 
action in confronting gross violations of human rights by the Habyarimana regime. 
DPKO steadfastly held to the line that UNAMIR was to remain a neutral force and allow 
diplomacy to work with Habyarimana. 
Intelligence reports received in Kigali began to make the Belgian contingent of 
UNAMIR uncomfortable. The reports, later collaborated by a high level Interahamwe 
informant known as Jean Pierre, indicated that Belgian UNAMIR forces were being 
targeted to get the country to pull out of UNAMIR. These reports were to prove 
extremely prophetic after April 6. On February 14, the Belgian Foreign Minister Willy 
Claes asked the Security Council for an increase in the mandate of UNAMIR. This 
request apparently received virtually no attention. On March 30, the Secretary-General 
made a progress report to the Security Council, which described the political stalemate, 
the deterioration of the security situation and the humanitarian situation in Rwanda.87 He 
formally requested a six-month extension of the UNAMIR mandate. A reluctant Security 
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Council authorized a 4-month extension of the mandate on April 5. The next day April 6, 
full-blown genocide commenced within the country. 
UNAMIR proved incapable of preventing the murder of various Hutu figures in 
the government. In a tragic event foretold by the Interahamwe informant, 10 Belgian 
peacekeepers were killed after surrendering their weapons to FAR troops who had come 
to murder the Prime Minister. This event precipitated a Belgian withdrawal of its forces 
from UNAMIR. In his notification to the UN, Foreign Minister Claes declared that the 
"requirements to pursue a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were no longer met, the 
Arusha peace plan was dead, and there were not means for a dialogue between the 
parties; consequently the UN should suspend UNAMIR."88 The Security Council's strict 
adherence to the limited Chapter VI mandate now became a valid issue for discussion. 
There was no longer a peace to keep. 
Possible responses discussed by the Security Council in the weeks following the 
death of Habyarimana included increasing the mandate (Chapter VI to Chapter VII) and 
raising the force levels of UNAMIR (championed by Nigeria and the non-aligned 
members on the Security Council), complete withdrawal of the mission, and partial 
withdrawal of most of the force. The permanent members of the council believed that the 
only responsible decision was to reduce the presence and mandate of UNAMIR. 
The United States contingent argued that the UN had a duty to protect the lives of 
the UNAMIR forces, whose mandate, now that the Arusha Accords had ceased to be 
viable, was over. Failure to protect these forces, Michael Barnett a U.S. staff officer at the 
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DPKO stated, would make it harder in the future to recruit nations to supply 
peacekeepers: "the Security Council had a duty and obligation to protect the lives of the 
peacekeepers, and that failure to do so would make it harder to obtain troops for future 
operations."^ 
The Security Council, especially the permanent members, refused to acknowledge 
that events in Rwanda constituted genocide. Instead they referred to the events as large 
scale violence and ongoing violence. U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright 
proposed reducing UNAMIR to a small skeletal size operation in order to show the will 
of the international community.90 On April 21, Security Council Resolution 912 reduced 
the size of UNAMIR to 270 men with orders to secure a cease-fire. 
In a ironic twist of fate, Rwanda was occupying a seat on the Security Council 
during this time period. Des Forges noted: 
Rather than demand that the Rwandan representative resign from the 
council, they continued collaborating with him, thus treating his 
government as an honorable member of the world community. They did 
not insist that he absent himself from discussions about Rwanda or even 
that he observe the usual custom of abstaining from such discussions.91 
The ability to attend Security Council meetings and be party to the council 
debates was invaluable to the interim government of Rwanda. It enabled them to 
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determine that an increased mandate for UNAMIR would not be forthcoming. This 
knowledge appears to have led to an acceleration of the killings. 
It was not until the end of April that pressure began to build at the UN to both 
acknowledge the genocide and begin to confront it. Discussions began in the Security 
Council on the establishment of UNAMIR II with a Chapter VII mandate. Secretary- 
General Boutros-Ghali had himself been noticeably absent from the Security Council 
throughout the first weeks of the genocide, as he had been traveling on official business 
in Europe. The moral presence of the Secretary-General was thus absent from the council 
chambers at a crucial moment. 
During this period, the ability of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council to delay council action became evident. On May 3, President Clinton signed the 
revised PDD-25. This new directive not only assured that the United States would not 
engage in peacekeeping operations that did not affect its national security, but that it 
would use its veto power to ensure that the UN made coherent and disciplined choices on 
what peace keeping operations to support. Ambassador Albright using this new directive 
as her guide, effectively delayed a decision on the creation of UNAMIR II until May 17. 
By the time the RPF had won the civil war, stopped the genocide, and had 
established a new government of Rwanda on July 19, there was still according to Des 
Forges "about the same number of UNAMIR soldiers in Rwanda as there had been at the 
time of the withdrawal in April."92 The stalling actions in the Security Council had 
prevented a real increase in the mandate of UNAMIR until the crisis was virtually over. 
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C.       THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND PDD-25 
The United States experience in Somalia sealed the fate of potential American 
intervention into Rwanda. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia had begun as a result of 
internal population movements. These movements were directly related to the ongoing 
civil war that erupted after the overthrow of the repressive dictator General Mohammed 
Siad Barre. Walter Clarke in his book on the Somalia intervention, noted that "with the 
disappearance of the state after Siad Barre's retreat from Mogadishu in January 1991, 
power and leadership naturally drifted to local communities and sub clan-level 
leadership. "93 
Migration caused by the political vacuum and the war, created multiple 
humanitarian disasters including famine. "By mid-1992," Clarke notes, "thanks to a 
media aroused by angry humanitarian groups that pointed to the starvation in central 
Somalia, the drastic humanitarian problems of Somalia were well known."94 it was this 
media attention and the images of the famine that brought the situation to the attention of 
the west. President George Bush, who had just lost the November presidential election, 
came under intense pressure to act in the waning days of his administration. 
On December 3, 1993, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794, 
authorized the dispatch of an American led humanitarian mission into Somalia, a 
"coalition of willing states," known as the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) or 
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Operation Restore Hope as it was known to the American forces. Controversy 
immediately arose over the exact mission of the UNITAF forces. The United States 
Central Command, viewed the mission as a short-term operation that would be over 
within weeks, possibly by the inauguration of the new President. The American 
commander of UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope, U.S Marine LtGen. Robert Johnston 
thought he was given the mission to open the Mogadishu warehouses and the highways 
into the Somali interior for food shipments and not to disarm the clans or engage in state 
building.95 Johnston stated publicly that "the deployment of his U.S. Marine Corps 
would be strictly humanitarian and that his soldiers would use only whatever force was 
necessary to protect themselves and food convoys."9^ 
With the success of UNITAF/Restore Hope as defined by the UNITAF 
Commander's standards of the mission, the Clinton administration and the Pentagon 
began planning for a transfer of authority from the U.S. led UNITAF to the United 
Nations Somalia Mission (UNOSOM) H. UNSCR 814 established UNOSOM E in March 
1993. UNSCOM II widened the scope of peace-enforcement powers from protection of 
humanitarian relief supplies to securing the environment throughout Somalia.9^ 
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The establishment of UNOSOM II with its new mandate and the contentious 
withdrawal of the majority of the U.S. forces from Somalia soon led to confrontation with 
Mohammed Farah Aidid, one of the major Somali clan leaders. The UNOSOM II forces, 
Aidid claimed, had crossed the "Mogadishu Line" and compromised their neutrality. 
Aidid now viewed their actions as counter to his interests and favoring his rival. On June 
5,1993, forces loyal to Aidid attacked and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. 
The Security Council was rightly outraged by this heinous event and quickly 
drafted UNSCR 837, which authorized the Secretary-General: 
to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed 
attacks...to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout 
Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their 
arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment.98 
This resolution amounted to a declaration of war against Aidid and his clan 
forces. 
The United States deployed a force of over 400 special operations personnel 
known as Task Force Ranger, to supplement UNOSOM II's Quick Reaction Forces, to 
assist in the efforts to locate and capture Aidid. These new U.S. forces answered directly 
to a U.S. chain of command instead of through the UNOSOM II commander. 
In the period from August 1993 until the beginning of October, Task Force 
Ranger made several attempts to arrest Aidid and his lieutenants resulting in several 
fierce confrontations with the Somali clans. These attempts culminated on October 3rd in 
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a fierce battle in downtown Mogadishu. During another attempt to capture Aidid, three 
American helicopters were shot down with one pilot captured and held hostage by 
Aidid's forces, 18 American soldiers were killed with another 73 wounded. Somali 
casualties were estimated to be in the hundreds. 
The American commander of Task Force Ranger had requested heavy armor 
weapons, tanks and personnel carriers, as well as special AC-130 Gunship aircraft be sent 
to Somalia for his use. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, denied his request for the 
additional equipment. Aspin feared that approving this request at a point when the United 
States was supposed to be drawing down its commitment in Somalia, would be perceived 
as a renewed involvement in the country. This it was felt would not be a palatable option 
on Capitol Hill. 
1. The Fallout From Mogadishu: The Vietmalia Syndrome 
The repercussions from the October 3 battle in Mogadishu began almost 
immediately. The American commander of Task Force Ranger resigned from the Army 
the next day, accepting full responsibility for the mission. SecDef Aspin, acknowledged 
that he had been wrong to deny the operational commander in the field the equipment 
necessary to protect American soldiers and resigned from his office." 
On October 7, President Clinton addressed the nation and announced that all U.S. 
forces were to be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. Congress debated how 
soon the American troops were to be withdrawn from Somalia. Oddly enough, Harry 
Johnston and Ted Dagne write in their essay on the intervention, it was President's 
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Johnston and Ted Dagne write in their essay on the intervention, it was President's 
Clinton's own party that argued for a January 31 pullout date. The Republican leadership 
argued that this would only serve to "embarrass the President and place Congress in the 
position of "micromanaging" foreign policy."100 A compromise, eventually reached on 
the March 31st withdrawal date, placed sharp limits on any further U.S. actions in 
Somalia. The mission would now be limited to humanitarian support, dropping the nation 
building aspects and the pursuit of Aidid from the U.S. role. 
The most damaging consequence of all would be revealed in May 1994, with the 
public release of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), "Reforming Multilateral 
Peace Operations." This directive dictated a 180-degree reversal in foreign policy with 
respect to United States involvement in peacekeeping operations. PDD-25 came less then 
a year after Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), "Peacekeeping Operations," had 
provided for a much wider role for U.S. forces in UN peacekeeping operations, an 
approach dubbed, aggressive multilateralism. *°1 
A draft version of PDD-25, approved on July 19, 1993 had followed this policy 
line of aggressive multilateralism. The draft, notes Clinton administration staffer Ivo 
Daalder: 
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represented a major, albeit evolutionary, change in U.S. policy towards 
multilateral peace operations...which supported an enhanced use of 
multilateral operations, elevated the United Nations as a major actor on the 
world stage, and committed the United States to support such operations in 
all of their political, military, and financial dimensions.102 
The one-page introduction to the draft PDD was a forceful endorsement of 
multilateral peace operations. It suggested that peacekeeping often offered the best way 
for the international community to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts. The draft also 
supported the "rapid expansion" of UN operations, noted the greatly expanded U.S. roles 
in peacekeeping, and committed the Untied States to support these operations politically, 
militarily, and financially.103 Opposition to the expanded U.S. role was centered in the 
Department of Defense and was voiced forcefully by General Colin Powell, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
When it was finally released in May 1994, PDD-25 had been revised 
dramatically. It now addressed six major areas of concern for reform and improvement 
with regard to U.S. policy towards multilateral peace operations. Among its key 
provisions was the reduction in the amount that the United States provided to the UN for 
peacekeeping dues, from a level of 31.7 percent of the total to 25 percent. The United 
States Congress took this action unilaterally. Another main goal of the directive was a 
drive to seek efficiency and a reduction in the total costs of peacekeeping operations. 
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Probably, the main point of PDD-25, and the aspect that represented the most 
drastic change in U.S. policy, was the choice of which peace operations to support. In 
voting for peace operations at the UN, the United States would support well-defined 
peace operations providing finite windows of opportunity, allowing combatants to 
resolve their differences, and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. 104 
Taken at face value, this statement would appear to indicate a commitment to peace 
operations. 
There were a list of conditions that the United States would apply during the 
decision making process. These conditions served as a guide to the peace operation, as 
well as, whether the United States would vote in favor of UN involvement: 
•   Factors the United States will consider when voting for UN peace operations 
1. UN involvement would advance U.S. interests, with interest from the 
international community regarding problems on a multilateral basis. There 
was a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a 
regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: 
2. International aggression, or; Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with 
violence; Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation 
of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence. 
3. There were clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits 
on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
4. For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire would be 
in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force was 
deployed. 
5. For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international 
peace and security would be considered significant. 
6. The means to accomplish the mission were available, including the forces, 
financing and mandate appropriate to the mission. 
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7. The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the 
international community had been weighed and were considered 
unacceptable. 
8. The operation's anticipated duration was tied to clear objectives and 
realistic criteria for ending the operation. 
These factors aided in decision-making; they did not by themselves constitute a 
prescriptive device. Decisions had been and were be based on the cumulative weight of 
the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. 105 
These conditions, coupled with the influence of the semi official 
Weinberger/Powell doctrine make it almost unthinkable that American troops would be 
deployed on the African continent in a peacekeeping role in the future. The 
Weinberger/Powell doctrine, argues Ken Campbell, was the ultimate reaction to the 
Vietnam War. It forced a "rejection of the pre-Vietnam "can-do" confidence of the 
military, and its replacement with a post-Vietnam "No can do!" reluctance regarding the 
use of force in ambiguous foreign crises.106 The junior officers of the Vietnam conflict 
were now the overly cautious leaders of the U.S. military community. 
The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine outlined six conditions for the "proper" use of 
U.S. military force:107 
1. Vital interests of the nation need to be at stake. 
2. A clear commitment to victory must exist. 
3. Political and military objectives have to be clear. 
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4. The forces must be properly sized to achieve the objectives. 
5. Reasonable assurance of public and congressional support must be secured 
before intervening. 
6. Force must be used only as a last resort. 
The application of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine in foreign policy was solidly 
affirmed in the eyes of General Powell and the Joint Chiefs by the success of the Gulf 
War. Campbell states that the "largely successful outcome of Operation Desert Storm 
demonstrated to American military leaders that the Weinberger Doctrine on the proper 
use of force worked exceptionally well, thereby affirming and reinforcing, rather than 
"kicking," their Vietnam syndrome."108 The success of the Gulf War brought home the 
lesson of how to appropriately use American forces. 
2. Rwanda: No Stomach For Intervention 
The genocide campaign in Rwanda was the first U.S. post-Somalia experience 
with humanitarian intervention and the first test of PDD-25. Using this directive as 
guidance, the crisis in Rwanda did not measure up as a matter of U.S. national security 
interests. 
Several officials at the State Department and the Pentagon with responsibility 
over Rwanda have acknowledged that the U.S. received prior intelligence of the 
magnitude of the events occurring in Rwanda. U.S. staff officers at both the UN and the 
State Department had been privy to the warnings from the UNAMIR staff and had 
discussed the possibility of the situation deteriorating. 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense James Woods (1986-1994), recalled for a 
PBS Frontline TV episode, that he had listed Rwanda-Burundi as a potential trouble spot 
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for the new Clinton administration briefings in 1992. He was directed to remove it from 
the list with the guidance: "Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don't 
care. Take it off the list. It's not-U.S. national interest is not involved" and, you know, 
"we can't put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the 
Middle East and North Korea and so on."109 
Later, State Department spokesperson Christine Shelley repeatedly went to great 
lengths to avoid characterizing the events as genocide.HO Xo do so might, in accordance 
with the Genocide Convention of 1948, actually require the United States and other 
signatory nations to intervene. In light of the perception that changing the UNAMIR 
mandate was a non-starter, the fear within Washington was that to label the events 
genocide would cast a bad light on the administration's inaction. 
In Washington, the NSC worried that any involvement would be worse than 
Somalia, and that the domestic political environment would not allow this type of 
intervention to take place with American troops. Ironically, a study published in October 
1997 by the University of Maryland, Center for International and Security Studies and its 
Program on International Policy Attitudes found that a "significant gap exists between the 
US foreign policy community's perceptions of public attitudes and the results of polls 
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that ask Americans what role the US should play in the world."111 While most policy 
practitioners believed that Americans had negative feelings towards U.S. involvement in 
UN peacekeeping missions, the study found the opposite that a strong majority of 
Americans support the idea of UN peacekeeping based partly on humanitarian concerns. 
As a U.S. staff officer to the UN Department Peace Keeping Operations, Michael 
Barnett reported, "there was hardly a soul that argued for intervention."112 This 
sentiment is supported by statements from Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Marley, a U.S. 
Army officer with extensive experience in Africa, who was serving as a Political Military 
Adviser at the State Department at the time. "In late 1993/early 1994, no one asked for a 
human rights Chapter VII mandate. The U.S. government wanted only a low cost, 
traditional "observer" type peacekeeping operation with the consent of all parties 
concerned."113 The caveat of this thinking is that a valid cease-fire needs to be in place, a 
condition that had disappeared immediately following the onset of the killings. 
In the aftermath of Somalia and the battle for Mogadishu, the Clinton 
administration had no stomach to enter into another potential peacekeeping quagmire. 
The important Congressional elections of 1994 would be coming up, a factor that had not 
gone unnoticed during the early discussions on the situations. Lieutenant Colonel Marley 
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recounted for Frontline that: "One official even asked a question as to what possible 
outcome there might be on the congressional elections later that year were the 
administration to acknowledge that this was genocide taking place in Rwanda and not be 
seen to do nothing about it."H4 Another fear, given the environment in Washington 
following Somalia and the subsequent domestic political attacks that were leveled against 
the UN Secretariat, was that any United States intervention would just provide more 
ammunition to Senators Jesse Helms and Robert Dole. These Senators had been two of 
the more vocal critics of the Somalia operation and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 
D.        FRANCE 
France had long had a strong sense of attachment to its former colonial 
possessions and African nations, including Rwanda, that were French speaking. They 
maintained a special office within the president's office at the Elysee Palace, the Africa 
Unit (Cellule Africaine).115 The existence of this office at the presidential level suggests 
the depth to which the French held with regard to their role in Francophone Africa and 
their antipathy towards the perceived threat of an extended Anglo-Saxon sphere of 
influence. During the period before and after the invasion of the RPF, Jean-Christophe 
Mitterrand, the French president's son, headed this office. President Habyarimana's 
Falcon-50 jet, crewed by a French crew with links to the French Air Force, was in fact a 
gift from Jean Christophe Mitterrand. 
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The French have not been reticent about using their military power on the 
continent when it suits their own national interests. The OAU IPEP investigation found 
that: 
From the perspective of Paris, the main elements were clear enough: 
France's unilateral insistence that its former African colonies constituted 
its indivisible sphere of influence in Africa; the conviction that it had a 
special relationship with francophone Africa; the understanding that its 
role in Africa gave France much of its international status; a general 
attitude that France had to be permanently vigilant against a perceived 
"anglo-saxon," (i.e. American) conspiracy to oust France from Africa; the 
close links between the elites in France and francophone Africa, which in 
Rwanda notably included the two presidents as well as their sons; and 
finally, France's need to protect its economic interests in Africa, although 
Rwanda as such was not a great economic prize.116 
The 1975 TMAA stipulated that military assistance of French troops in Rwanda 
was to be limited to that of the role of instructors, although the OAU IPEP found that this 
was later changed. "The main goal of the arrangement was to offer technical assistance in 
the development of a national police force; one clause explicitly prohibited French 
involvement in military and police affairs. In 1983, the agreement was revised, this key 
clause being removed."117 The removal of this clause would prove to be instrumental in 
France's efforts to its ally, President Habyarimana, in power after 1990. 
1. Code Name Norolt 
Following the October 1990 invasion by the RPF, France immediately deployed a 
company of the 2eme Regiment Etranger Parachutiste, from the Central African Republic 
116
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to Kigali, in an operation known as Noroit (North Wind.). The mission of the French 
forces was to protect French citizens and expatriates. Following an attack on the capital 
city, staged by the Habyarimana government to draw greater attention to the threat at 
hand, French troops deployed to Rwanda was increased to nearly 600. Over the next four 
years, the number and tactical commitment of French troops increased. 
French soldiers were initially deployed in a non-combatant role. The services they 
provided freed the FAR forces for frontline duties and served as a morale booster. 
Prunier, states that the French forces "took care of the airport guard and logistics (large 
amounts of weapons and equipment were being flown in), looked after the government's 
helicopters and when necessary flew them, organised artillery positioning and 
ammunition supply, and ensured radio communications."118 The French Army would 
become even more directly involved until French officers were actually in control of the 
counterinsurgency operations for the Rwandans and Lieutenant Colonel Chollet, served 
as the military adviser to President Habyarimana. French soldiers also were known to 
have been involved with the interrogation of prisoners and were reported to be involved 
directly in the control of artillery firing.119 
France was a major supplier of military equipment and weapons to the 
Habyarimana regime and the FAR during the period following the October 1990 RPF 
invasion.120 France also acted as an intermediary for second party arms transactions. A 
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deal involving South Africa in particular was a violation of UN Resolution 588 that 
prohibited the importation of South African arms due to the international restrictions on 
the apartheid government. French arms shipments continued throughout the genocide, 
shifting from direct shipments into Rwanda to shipments transiting on the ground from 
Goma, Zaire. 
President Francois Mitterrand viewed the invasion by the Ugandan backed RPF as 
a clear assault on the francophone zone, since Uganda was led by the English speaking 
American backed President Yoweri Museveni. The RPF, who spoke English were 
portrayed as a foreign invader, and thus continued aid was justified to an ally under 
attack. Many officials of the Mitterrand government have held the position that the RPF 
was an American trained force; certainly, it was true that officers such as Major Paul 
Kagame had received American training in the past that justified the French support, even 
in the face of growing evidence of the Habyarimana regime's human rights abuses against 
the populace.121 The Mitterrand government rarely failed to champion the Habyarimana 
regime as the "protector of human rights" and the injured party in the ongoing conflict. 
France made concerted efforts within international forums to support the 
Habyarimana government's claim of an invasion by outside forces and preempt any 
characterization of the conflict as a civil war. The French ambassador to Rwanda, 
Georges Martres sent a telegram home to this effect, emphasizing the necessity of 
portraying the RPF as an external threat.122 After a documented Hutu massacre of Tutsi 
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civilians in 1992, the ambassador refused to join a delegation of OECD diplomatic 
representatives, led by the United States and Canadian ambassadors, in protesting to 
President Habyarimana. Ambassador Martres was referred to by the other diplomats in 
Rwanda as the Rwandan Ambassador to France.123 
The French played a major role in backing the Habyarimana regime, were aware 
of the planning for the genocide, provided valuable military support roles following the 
1990 invasion by the RPF and were involved in training members of Interahamwe. Still it 
took the French government until 1998 to hold investigations to examine their role in the 
genocide. The result was an acknowledgement that while France had played a 
considerable role, according to the chairman of the investigating committee Paul Quiles, 
'Trance is neither responsible nor guilty." 124 The blame for the international inaction, in 
the eyes of the committee, was largely in the hands of the international community, 
mainly the United States and the United Nations. 
2. Operation Turquoise 
By June  1994,  internal political pressure began to mount on the French 
government to intervene in Rwanda to save the Habyarimana government. President 
Mitterrand had already received several prominent members of the genocidaires in 
France in their flight from Rwanda, and others had been sheltered in the French Embassy 
within Rwanda. The French almost certainly continued to supply the FAR with weapons 
through Goma, Zaire as late as June 1994. 
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Much speculation has been offered about the reasons for French to finally 
intervene in late June 1994, nearly three months into the genocide. Suspected motivations 
for the intervention ranged from a desire to try to save their patrons in the Habyarimana 
government, to a last ditch attempt to stave off an Anglophone Great Lakes region in 
Africa. A compromise could be forced, to combat the imposition of a Tutsi RPF 
government of Rwanda, through a negotiated settlement that would keep the extremists in 
a position of power. 
On June 22,1994, the Security Council voted UNSCR 929 which gave France the 
mandate to conduct a humanitarian intervention into Rwanda under Chapter VII articles. 
In the morning hours of 23 June, the first French elements of Operation Turquoise landed 
in Goma, Zaire. The RPF was concerned by the size of the firepower that the expected 
French deployment would bring, but were given assurances by the chief planner that the 
power was for contingencies only, and would remain in Goma unless needed. 125 
By the time the French forces had arrived, most of the killing had occurred, the 
FAR and the militia forces were in disarray and retreating in front of the advancing RPF 
forces. French forces found little left to save. They did ensure that whatever they could 
save was documented by the media, in a clumsy attempt to put the best face on their 
efforts and to blunt the severe criticism of their overall involvement with the 
Habyarimana government. They created a Zone Humanitaire Sure (Safe Humanitarian 
Zone), which served to form a conduit for the escaping FAR and militia forces to elude 
the advancing RPF, and escape across the borders to Zaire. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS 
The international community failed as custodians of the peace process in Rwanda. 
Every major international body that has studied the events that occurred make strong note 
of the lack of will and resolve on the part of the major bodies to handle the crisis. The 
United Nations, as the ultimate arbiter of international security, abrogated its duties in 
difference to the leading nations of that organization, which viewed the Rwandan 
situation through the narrow realist view of national interests. 
The permanent members of the Security Council were deficient in their duties to 
"maintain international peace and security."126 The United States used its own national 
security interests as the test criteria for its support of a robust engagement in the Arusha 
implementation, and for strong intervention following the breakout of the genocide. It 
preferred to pursue legal obfuscation of the facts of the genocide occurrence to avoid a 
further entanglement in the situation. 
It also can be said that while the international community failed as the custodians 
of the Arusha Peace, it does appear as if there was a case of clear disconnect on the role 
that was anticipated of the UN in the fulfillment of the accords, between the mediators 
and the UN. The mediators and the parties to Arusha, envisioned the role of the UN as 
that of an overall security blanket for the process, a true guarantor of the peace transition. 
Alan Kuperman writes, that clearly this is what the parties involved believed would 
occur. President Habyarimana himself relayed this thinking when he said: "I think that 
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this force will be there to provide security to everyone."127In retrospect the mediators 
should have been aware of the growing reluctance on the part of the Security Council to 
engage in a full blown peace keeping mission and that assigning this role without 
advance engagement with the council was a serious mistake. 
The UN Security Council, by contrast was not in the mood for another 
peacekeeping operation following on the heels of Somalia. It authorized the UNAMIR 
force under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) articles. This is a vital distinction 
because Chapter VI is traditional peacekeeping which requires a clearly established peace 
with a very limited rules of engagement for the UN force. Once the peace ceased to exist, 
as far as the Security Council was concerned, so had the mandate of UNAMIR. A 
Chapter VII mandate provides in Article 42, that the Security Council, "may take such 
action by air, sea, land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security."128 
A.       UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
The general nature of conflict in the post Cold War world has changed from that 
of inter state conflict to intra state. Human rights have moved to the forefront of 
intranational peace and security issues. The Security Council has failed to adapt to these 
new security issues. 
There is a need for a more representative Security Council. A council that is more 
democratic and transparent has been a persistent demand from UN members outside of 
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the permanent five. Predictably discussions regarding the reform of the Security Council 
within the "Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on 
and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council" have split along the fault lines 
between the industrialized and developing nations, the permanent members versus the 
rest of the General Assembly, and those favoring retention of the veto power versus 
reforming the veto power. The end result has been an understanding of the need for 
Security council reform with no true progress towards a resolution of the issues. 
B.       AFRICAN REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES 
During  1998, the growing ethnically motivated humanitarian crisis in the 
Yugoslavian province of Kosovo garnered widespread international attention. The crisis 
drove the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a regional 
security organization, to intervene unilaterally, and forcibly inside the sovereign nation of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO also acted without the formal approval, in the 
form of a resolution authorizing Chapter VII actions, of the United Nation's Security 
Council. The United Nations Charter in Article 2 Paragraph 4(1) expressly confers on the 
Security Council the primary role amongst signatory nations, of maintenance of 
international peace and security. NATO recognized the potential for Security Council 
paralysis regarding this issue and decided to act. 
NATO's intervention was based on the perceived need for a humanitarian 
solution to the Kosovar Albanian crisis. The fact that NATO acted without the Security 
Council Chapter VII resolution authorizing the use of force, is itself a recognition that the 
Security Council as presently constituted, is a roadblock to handling intrastate human 
rights on the international level. In this case the looming fear of a Russian or Chinese 
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veto of any Security Council resolution authorizing force against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, necessitated NATO's action without Security Council authorization. 
NATO had the capacity to unilaterally intervene inside Kosovo. This is a capacity 
that does not exist in Africa. Additionally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is 
different when it comes to responding to intrastate conflict then the United Nations 
Security Council. This was a deliberate decision at the time of the creation of the OAU 
based on total difference to the sovereignty of the signatory nations and the leaders. 
NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo situation based on the humanitarian 
imperatives that arose in the fall and winter of 1998/1999, is in itself not a new 
phenomenon. During the 1990s, there have been two examples of international 
interventions in sovereign territory under the guise of a UN mandate. The first example to 
consider is the continuing international involvement in the Iraqi "No-Fly" zones 
following the Gulf War (this is a US and British affair). The second major humanitarian 
involvement was the attempt to intervene in the Somali civil war, first by the United 
States and a coalition of willing nations and later by the UN Chapter VII mission 
UNOSOM, which would carry with it a major price tag with regard to the future 
involvement of the United States in these types of endeavors. 
The critical difference between the Kosovo situation and that which existed in 
Rwanda from August of 1993 through June of 1994, is a matter of strong regional 
mandate and capacity. NATO, at the time of the Kosovo intervention, had a fifty-year 
history as a regional security organization with considerable military capacity. NATO 
had itself been forced to alter its views on the issue of human rights with the end of the 
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Cold War. The Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s forced the organization to confront the 
issue headlong and it learned valuable yet painful lessons as a member of the 
UNPROFOR force that had stood by impotently at places like Srebrenica where gross 
abuses of human rights had occurred. 
The OAU was not formed as counter to a common threat such as NATO was with 
the Soviet Union. Instead Cedric de Coning wrote on the role of the OAU in conflict 
management in Africa: 
Africa's colonial legacy resulted in the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states being embedded in the Charter of the 
OAU as one of the 'unshakeable' founding principles. This principle 
effectively precluded collective action to address civil wars and other 
internal conflicts in Africa by the OAU or other African government 
institutions in the past.129 
It was not until 1993, that the OAU finally established a "Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution," in partial recognition of the diminished 
importance the continent would have with the post Cold War West. The Mechanism 
acknowledged that the experiences of postcolonial Africa had demonstrated that; 
internal conflicts generate massive flows of displaced people and refugees, 
encourage the proliferation of arms which continues to fuel conflicts, spur 
crime and destroy the (economic/investment) credibility of the subregion 
and eventually that of the entire continent.130 
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The combination of these factors it was realized, was hindering the development 
of the region and forced the recognition that internal conflict in Africa were increasingly 
becoming transnational in its effects. 
The next important step for the nations of the OAU is to develop the military 
capacity, along the lines of smaller NATO, to be able to unilaterally intervene on the 
continent in the absence of Security Council interest in supporting a UN operation on the 
continent. "The OAU's lack of resources, especially financial," de Coning believes, "will 
deny it the freedom to unilaterally decide on the strategic, tactical and operational aspects 
of peace operations which it may wish to initiate."131 The question is then how does the 
OAU and the nations obtain the resources to grow this capacity? 
The recognition of the disengagement of the West and the realization that the goal 
of complete liberation from colonial rule on the continent had been achieved has resulted 
in the recent announcement that the OAU would transform itself. The new organization, 
the African Union is designed to act along the lines of the European Union, will become 
operational in July 2001. While full details are still developing, one goal has been stated. 
The Union will have the right to intervene in member states in cases of genocide and war 
crimes. OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim stated, "Africa and African Union 
cannot afford to stand by and watch another genocide like that in Rwanda takes place and 
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Concurrent with this identification of the need to develop an organic capability to 
manage and deploy peace operations was the realization by the nations of the West that 
they no longer had the same level of national security interests on the continent. This 
awareness led to a desire to disengage selectively from involvement on the continent. To 
achieve this disengagement without totally abrogating any responsibility for crisis on the 
continent, it was realized that the west, mainly in the form of the former colonial powers 
and the United States, would need to build a peace operations capacity within the OAU 
and its member states. 
The first of these attempts was the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The 
intended purpose of the ACRF was to seek a partnership between African states, the UN, 
the OAU and others to build the capabilities of African militaries for responding to 
international crises. Its long-term objective would be to improve the international 
community's ability to react quickly to crises in Africa and elsewhere, as well as to 
develop Africans' role in responding to crises worldwide.133 
This response from the African nations to this proposal was overwhelmingly 
negative. The interpretation by the Africans was that the United Nations and the 
Europeans were attempting to abandon Africa. The reaction to this interpretation is 
somewhat surprising considering a key component of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution is the capacity building aspect for African 
nations, earmarking forces for peacekeeping operations and the need for financial 
133
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assistance from the United States to facilitate this development. ACRF appeared to offer 
these aspects. 
The next step in the pursuit of building an organic African peace keeping capacity 
has been the ongoing effort known collectively as the "P3 Initiatives." The P3 is a joint 
effort between the United States, France and the United Kingdom in which the three 
countries sought to coordinate and strengthen their individual policies. Each nation 
provides a portion of the project. 
The U.S. portion is known as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) 
stresses the organization, training, assistance and advising of up to a battalion level of 
African nations. The training is conducted by U.S. Special Forces to establish an 
individual and unit capability to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian relief 
operations, classical peacekeeping training and related equipment is provided. Training is 
tailored to the needs and capabilities of the individual countries. ACRI provides 
equipment for the soldier and the battalion, more importantly with an eye for inter- 
operability the equipment supplied meets UN specifications to the greatest extent 
possible. 
The United Kingdom portion is known as U.K. African Peacekeeping Training 
Support Program. A major element of the United Kingdom program is the developing of 
the Army Staff Colleges of Ghana and Zimbabwe into regional peacekeeping centers. 
British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) are based in both of these 
countries and provide training to not only the national forces but other Africa countries. 
In addition to bi-lateral assistance, the U.K. has been involved in regional peacekeeping 
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exercises in Zimbabwe  involving     members  of the  South African Development 
Community (SADC). 
The French portion is known as the Reinforcement of African Military 
Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP). The components of France's efforts include 
the creation of a training center for peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast, the pre-positioning 
of French equipment in Senegal capable of equipping a peacekeeping battalion 
(maintained and monitored by French soldiers), and the organization of peacekeeping 
exercises on the African continent. A purpose of the French initiative notes Eric G. 
Berman, and Katie E. Sams, RECAMP aims to develop standby force modules that can 
be called upon to participate in UN-and OAU-authorized operation.134 
The thinking behind the P3 initiative is that: 
torn between domestic demands for a further engagement in case of 
humanitarian catastrophes on the African continent and diminishing will 
to supply own troops, the idea of "African capacities" for conflict solution 
under "African Ownership" became central in the intercontinental 
dialogue.135 
The P3 initiative was advanced in the firm belief that:136 
There will continue to be a substantial requirement for international efforts in 
support of peace and stability, including on the African continent; 
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• intrastate conflict (either civil war or the collapse of 'failed' states) is likely to 
cause the most, and the most intractable problems; 
• pressure from public and political opinion, for the international community, 
including regional organizations, to intervene, will continue; and 
• it makes good sense for African states themselves to be part of such an 
international response. 
• 
The P3 is based on four guiding principles: 
• Long-term capacity enhancement particularly the capacity to mount rapid and 
collective responses to humanitarian and other crises, consistent with the 
objectives and the parameters established within the UN stand by arrangements. 
This goal will be achieved through coordinated and sustained efforts to increase 
interoperability through training, joint exercises and the development of common 
peace keeping doctrine. There is no intention of creating a standing African 
force. 
• These activities would be carried out in consultation with the OAU or the future 
African Union (AU) and the United Nations. 
• All African states will be eligible to participate, with the exception of those 
subject to UN sanctions. 
• There will be full transparency of the organization with the international 
community to Africa. 
The general response amongst African nations towards the P3 initiatives has not 
been one of overwhelming approval. Once again the fear is that the initiative is a prelude 
to complete western withdrawal from the continent. The positive side of this fear has 
been a growing desire on the part of the African nations to take primary responsibility for 
resolving their own problems. The metamorphous of the OAU into the new African 
Union can be viewed as a major positive effort of this process. 
With the prospect for UN Security Council reform a dim reality, the only realistic 
prospect for the nations of Africa to handle their complex conflicts is the development of 
their own capacities. The P3 offers the path towards building a "regional plus" capability, 
whereby the nations of Africa will build their own organic capabilities but will also enjoy 
the support of the major western powers, in the form of logistical capacity and training. 
94 
The certainty of realist practices within the western governments makes it impractical to 
count on the complete engagement on the continent by these powers in the future. The P3 
plan offers the most reasonable compromise to the complex security problems of the 
African continent. 
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